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1.  Introduction
There is a growing recognition that differences in economic outcomes, whether at
the level of the individual or household or at the level of the state, cannot be explained
fully by  differences in "traditional"  inputs such as  labor, land, and physical  capital.
Growing attention is given to the role of "social capital" in affecting the well-being of
households and the level of development of communities and nations.
The recognition that  social capital is an input in  a household's  or  a  nation's
production function has major implications for development policy and project design.  It
suggests that  the  acquisition of  human  capital and  the  establishment  of  a  physical
infrastructure needs to be complemented by institutional development in order to reap the
full benefits of these  investments.  The promotion of social interaction  among poor
farmers  may  need  to  complement  the  provision  of  seeds  and  fertilizer.  A  well
functioning  parent-teacher association  may  be  a  necessary complement  to  building
schools and training teachers.
While there are many definitions and  interpretations of the concept  of  social
capital, there is a growing consensus that "social capital stands for the ability of actors to
secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures"
(Portes, 1998, p. 6). If one takes a broad view of what is comprised by these "other social
structures," then social capital is a relevant concept at the micro, meso, and macro levels.'
Reviews of the social capital literature can be found in Grootaert  (1997),  Portes (1998),
Woolcock (1998) and Narayan and Woolcock (1999).  On the role of social capital in
sustainable  development,  see Serageldin  (1996).Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  5
At the macro level, social capital includes institutions such as government, the rule of
law, civil and political liberties, etc.  There is overwhelming evidence that such macro-
level social capital has a measurable impact on national economic performance (Knack,
1999). At the micro and meso levels, social capital refers to the networks and norms that
govern interactions among individuals, households and communities.  Such networks are
often (but not necessarily) given structure through the creation of local associations or
local institutions. 2
Putnam's  (1993) seminal analysis of civic traditions in Italy focuses primarily on
"horizontal" associations in which members relate to each other on an equal basis, but
Coleman (1988, 1990) has argued that social capital can include "vertical" associations as
well, characterized by hierarchical relationships and unequal power distribution among
members.
The  analysis  in  this  paper  is  limlited to  social  capital  at  the  micro  level
(individuals, households) and at the meso level (community).  We utilize the broader
definition which includes both horizontal and vertical associations.  The objective of the
paper is to investigate empirically the links between social capital, household welfare and
poverty in the case of Indonesia. Specifically, we undertake a multivariate analysis of the
role of local institutions in  affecting household welfare and poverty outcomes and in
2  We use the term "local institution" interchangeably  with "local association" or  "local
organization". This follows  the practice  of most social science  literature  (Uphoff,  1993),  but
there is a subtle  distinction  between  the two concepts. Uphoff  (1993) defines  institutions  as
"complexes  of norms and behaviors  that persist over time by serving collectively  valued
purposes"  (p. 614), while organizations  are "structures  of recognized  and accepted roles"
(p. 614). Examples  of institutions  are money,  the law, marriage. Organizations  are PTAs,
workers' unions,  rotating  credit associations.  In some cases,  the two terms  overlap: the army
is an institution  as well as a group of soldiers,  the parliament  is a law-making  institution  as
well as an association  of law makers. As Uphoff  (1993)  argues,  the distinction  is a matter  of
degree,  and organizations  can  become  more  or less "institutional"  over time.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  6
determining access to  services.  In that setting, we compare the impact of household
memberships in local associations with the impact of human capital.
The literature contains an impressive and still growing number of case studies
which document that local associations play a key role in successful project design and in
determining project sustainability.  This has been demonstrated in almost all parts of the
world  and  in  sectoral  settings ranging  from  irrigation and  water  supply,  to  forest
management and management of wildlife resources, to the provision of credit to the poor
and the implementation of health service programs. 3 The way local associations perform
their useful role is centered around three mechanisms: the sharing of information among
association  members, the  reduction of  opportunistic behavior,  and the  facilitation of
collective decision making (Grootaert, 1997; Collier, 1998b).
At the level of the community, local associations can be a manifestation of social
capital.  However, it must be emphasized that social capital and local associations are not
synonyms.  Social capital can and does exist outside the context of local  institutions
(whether formal or informal).  For example, two neighbors who help each other in times
of trouble have social capital but may never embody their bond in an association.  Vice
versa, the mere presence of an association does not prove the existence of social capital.
Local branches of political parties, with mandatory membership, are associations which
may display little or no social capital. For that reason, it is important to look at
3  Many case studies are cited by Uphoff  (1993),  Narayan  (1995),  Grootaert  (1997),  Krishna  et
al (1997),  Uphoff  et a] (1998),  and Woolcock  (1998).Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  7
membership  conditions  (voluntary or no1, payment  of  fees,  etc.)  and  the  degree of
effective participation in associations before inferring social capital effects.  The analysis
below will include some of these aspects.
While the literature on social capital has amply demonstrated the importance of
social  capital  in  the  context  of  developmnent  projects  and  the  provision  of  various
services, it has not  yet demonstrated what the implications of the presence  of social
capital are for the welfare  of households and whether social  capital helps  the  poor.
Indeed, the distribution of social capital, like other forms of capital, could well be skewed
in favor of the rich.  Furthermore, most empirical studies of the impact of social capital
are  set  in  the  context  of  a  specific  project  or  in  a  limited  geographical  area
(village/region).  The use of national-level data bases is quite rare.  These studies have
also rarely quantified the impact of social capital in a formal analysis, i.e. controlling for
other  factors which  affect  outcomes. 4 Notable  exceptions are  Isham,  Narayan  and
Pritchett  (1995) who  measure  quantitatively the  relative contribution  of  beneficiary
participation on the effectiveness of rural vvater supply projects, and Isham, Kaufinann
and  Pritchett (1995) who demonstrate that the rate of return of World Bank-financed
projects is greater in countries with good civil liberties, after controlling for a variety of
other determinants of project performance. 5
4  There is a certain irony to this, given that Coleman's (1988) seminal work on the role of
social  capital  in the acquisition  of human  capital-the article  most frequently  cited as being at
the origin of the current interest in social capital-included a formal quantitative  approach
(logit  regressions  of social  capital  on drop-out  rates among  U.S. high school  students).
In contrast  to the literature  of social  capital  at the household,  community  or project level, the
literature that investigates  the effects of social capital at the level of the nation is highly
quantitative  and a large portion  of it consists  of econometric  cross-country  analyses. Knack
(1999)  reviews  this literature.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  8
A recent study by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) has demonstrated econometrically
that the ownership of social capital by households in Tanzania has  strong effects on
households' welfare.  The study found that the magnitude of the estimated effect exceeds
that of education and physical assets owned by the household.  It also concluded that the
effects of  social capital operate primarily at the village level.  Instrumental variable
methods were used to rule out reverse causation from income to  social capital.  The
authors measured social capital as a single index, combining (interactively) the number of
local groups in a village, kin and income heterogeneity, and effective group functioning.
The relevance of these aspects of social capital have been demonstrated in the literature.
Putnam (1993) has suggested that it is the density of associations that primarily explains
the difference in economic performance between North and South Italy.  Other authors
have focused on the nature of participation in groups and the structure of the groups
(Uphoff, 1992; Narayan, 1995; Ostrom, 1995).
The Narayan/Pritchett study is a pioneering effort in the way  different social
capital dimensions are combined to estimate quantitatively their impact on household
welfare based on a national-level household survey.  The study's remarkable finding that
in  Tanzania  social  capital matters  more  for  household welfare  than  human  capital,
constitutes a challenge to investigate this issue for other countries to assess how general
this finding is.  We undertake this task for Indonesia in this paper, and for Bolivia and
Burkina Faso in companion papers (Grootaert and Narayan, 1999; Grootaert, Oh and
Swamy, 1999).  However, in these papers, we go well beyond replication and extend the
analysis in several directions, which will shed additional light on the way social capital
embodied in local institutions affects household welfare.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Posverty  in Indonesia  9
First, we consider six social capital dimensions: the density of associations, their
internal  heterogeneity,  the  frequency  of  meeting  attendance,  members'  effective
participation  in  decision  making, payment  of  dues  (in  cash  and  in  kind),  and  the
community orientation of associations (section 3).  These can be combined in an index or
each  dimension  can be  considered  in  the  model  separately.  Since the  conceptual
literature on social capital does not provicle guidance to prefer one approach over the
other, we test both approaches empirically (sections 4 and 5).
Second, in addition to estimating the effects on household welfare, we model the
impact of ownership of social capital on the incidence of poverty.  We also attempt to
compare the returns to social capital between poor and non-poor households (section 5).
Third, the impact of social capital on household welfare is usually indirect:  it
operates through access to  credit, asset accumulation, collective action,  etc.  We will
attempt to measure some of these links directly (sections 6.1 to 6.3).
Fourth, we revisit the question of whLether  social capital operates at the household
level or at the village level.  While Narayan and Pritchett relied on village averages of
household-level indicators, the analysis be:low uses independent and historical village
information (section 6.4).
Fifth,  the  Tanzania  study  did  not  distinguish  between  different  types  of
organizations and assumed in fact that each association has the same effect, regardless of
whether it is, e.g., a parent/teacher association, a church group, or a local political party
committee.  In the analysis below, we differentiate four types of institutions and paySocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  10
specific attention to the differential impact between voluntary associations and those with
mandatory membership (section 7).
Lastly, we  revisit the  question of causality:  does social capital cause higher
incomes or do households with high incomes have better access to associational life?  We
use instrumental variable methods using independent village data to address this question
(section 8).
Before turning to the empirical results, we discuss in the next section the data set,
and the comparative study of which it is part.Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  11
2.  The Data  Set
The data set for this paper comes from the Local Level Institutions (LLI) Study, a
comparative study of three countries (Bolivia, Burkina Faso and Indonesia), which aims
to investigate the role of local institutions in providing service delivery and in affecting
welfare and poverty outcomes. 6 Data were collected at the level of the community, the
district and the household.
At the level of the community, interviews with focus groups of households and
with community leaders were held to establish a map of functioning institutions in the
community.  Three instruments were used:
*  Infornation on community services was obtained through interviews with key
informants such as  village chief, teacher, health  provider, etc.  This  was
supplemented with  information on  the  local  economy  (infrastructure and
distance to  markets), local  society (ethnic/religious composition) and  local
institutions.  Recent experience with selected development projects was also
discussed.
*  The community services were also discussed with groups of households, with
an objective to learn the community's perspective on the quality of service, its
experience  with  collective action, and  its  views on  local  institutions  and
development projects.
6  The objective of the Local Level Institutions study and the questionnaires  are further
discussed  in World  Bank (1998).Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  12
*  For the most important local institutions, interviews were held with  leaders
and members, as well as with non-members, in order to get a balanced view of
the role of the institutions in the village, their development over time, their
main activities, relations with  other institutions and  government, and their
main strengths and weaknesses.
At the  district level  (defined as the administrative level  above the village or
community), data were collected about the extent of service coverage and the institutional
arrangements for the provision of services.  Information was also obtained about the
general functioning of the district administration and its relation with civic organizations,
through interviews with general and sectoral managers at the district level.
The third and critical part of the data collection was a household survey which
aimed  to  capture  households'  actual participation in  local  institutions,  their  use  of
services, and information that identifies the welfare level of households and their coping
strategies.  The questionnaire consisted of six sections:
*  demographic information on household members
*  participation in local institutions
*  characteristics of the most important groups
*  service provision profiles
*  perceptions of community trust and collaboration
*  household economy and coping strategies.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  13
The limited resources available did not make possible a sampling framework such
that the studies would be representative of the countries at the national level.  Instead,
three or four areas were selected in each country (municipios in Bolivia, provinces in
Burkina Faso and Indonesia), which represent different economic, social and institutional
environments.
In  the  case  of  Indonesia, the  collected  data  cover  the  rural  areas  of  three
provinces:  Jambi, Jawa Tengah, and Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT).  Jambi is located on
the island of Sumatra. It is a tropical forest area which was only recently colonized and is
still an agricultural frontier zone.  It is characterized by low population density and its
socio-economic indicators are close to Indonesian averages or slightly below (Table 1).
Among the three provinces, Jambi has the lowest level of inequality in the distribution of
household expenditure. Jawa Tengah is in ihe center of the island of Java, about 500 kms
away from Jakarta.  It has a very high population density (867 people/kin 2) and is the
most urbanized of the three provinces.  It has also the highest income level and the best
access to education and health services and to housing amenities. The population of both
Jambi and Jawa Tengah is 99% Muslim. NI1T consists of a series of islands in the eastern
part  of Indonesia (about 2500 kms and tvwo  time zones away from Jambi) and is the
poorest  and  least urbanized of the three study areas.  It  relies heavily  on traditional
agriculture and fewer than 5% of its economically active population have wage-jobs.  The
population is almost entirely Christian, evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants.
Within each province two districts (kabupaten) were selected to participate in the
study, and within each district two sub-districts (kecamnatan)  were selected.  These units
were selected purposively so as to represent a range of social, economic and institutionalSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  14
situations.  Within each sub-district, four villages were selected based on location criteria
(upland/lowland  and  near/far  to  growth  center).  Within  each  of  the  48  villages,
25 households were selected randomly to participate in the household survey. 7 The sub-
districts were Sarolangon Bangko and Batang Han in Jambi, Banyumas and Wonogiri in
Jawa Tengah, and Timor Tengha Selatan and Ngada in NTT.  In each sub-district, 200
households were interviewed for a total sample of 1,200 households. 8
Table 1: Selected Socio-economic Indicators of the Three Study Areas
Jambi  Jawa  Nusa  Indonesia
Tengah  Tenggara
I  ___  _____  _  I  t  Timiur
Population  ('000)  2,370  29,653  3,577  194,755
Area ('000 km 2)  44.8  34.2  47.9  1,919.3
Population  Density  (people/kn 2)  53  867  75  101
% Urbanized  27.2  31.9  13.9  35.9
% of Households  with  Access  to Electricity  30.5  71.1  14.5  57.2
Gross  Primary  Enrollment  Ratio  95  97  91  95
Gross  Secondary  Enrollment  Ratio  47  58  44  56
% of Heads  of  Household  who  are  Farmers  71  67  92  771/
Household  Expenditure  per Capita  575.3  612.4  453.8  547.12'
('000  Rupiah/year) 2'
Gini-coefficient  0.29  0.36  0.37  1  0.351_
1 Based  on  the  three  study  areas  only.
2. At the  time  of  data  collection  (Fall  1996)  the  exchange  rate  was  in the  range  of $1  = 2,300-2,400  Rupiah.
Sources: Statistical  Yearbook  of  Indonesia  1995;  Statistik  Pendidikan  1994/95;  Penduduk  Indonesia,  Jambi,  Jawa
Tengah,  NTT-Hasil  Survei  Penduduk  Antar  Sensus  1995;  author's  calculations.
7  The data were collected  in the fall of 1996,  i.e. prior to the recent social and economic  crisis
in Indonesia. The macroeconomic  evolution  in the country  is reviewed  in Thorbecke  (1991)
and World Bank (1996).  Tjiptoherijanto  (1996) reviews the evolution of poverty and
inequality. Thorbecke  (1998)  provides  an initial  assessment  of the social  costs  of the crisis.
8  Grootaert (1999) further discusses  the demographic  and economic characteristics  of the
sample  households.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  15
3.  The Dimensions  of Social Capital
The effectiveness with which social capital, in the form of local associations, can
fulfill  its  role  in  disseminating  information,  reducing  opportunistic  behavior,  and
facilitating collective  decision making  depends on  many aspects  of  the  association,
reflecting its structure, its membership and its functioning. For this study we focus on six
aspects of local associations.
(1)  Density of membership.  This is measured by the number of memberships of
each household in existing associations. The provision of a map of local associations was
one of the prime objectives of the LLI study and a complete inventory of all existing
associations was made at the village level.  Flach  household was then given that inventory
and  asked  which  associations they were  a  member of.  The total  number of  active
memberships in the villages included in the sample added up to 6,210, which indicates
that on average each household is a member of about five associations.  However, there is
significant variation by province and according to the characteristics of the households.
With an average of  3.7 associational memberships per  households, density is
lowest in Jambi. In Jawa Tengah, each household belongs on average to 6 groups and in
NTT to 6.5 groups (Table 2).  This is in part related to the religious composition of the
population since Catholic households (who live only in NTT) are on average members of
8.3 groups, almost twice  as much as households of  other religions.  Female-headed
households  belong  on  average  to  one  group  less  than  male-headed  households.
Memberships rise quite sharply with the level of education but, at an aggregate level, they
are only slightly related to income level.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  16
(2)  Heterogeneity index.  The LLI questionnaire identifies the three most important
associations for each household.  For those associations, a number of supplementary
questions were asked including about the internal homogeneity of the group.  This was
rated according to eight criteria:  neighborhood, kin group, occupation, economic status,
religion, gender, age, and level  of education.  On that  basis, we  constructed a  score
ranging from 0 to 8 for each of the three associations (a value of one on each criterion
indicated that members  of the  association were  "mostly  from different"  kin  groups,
economic  status,  etc.).  The  score  of  the three  associations was  averaged  for  each
household and the resulting index was re-scaled from 0 to 100 (whereby 100 corresponds
to the highest possible value of the index). 9
The index of heterogeneity shows distinct regional and socio-economic patterns
(Table 2).  Associations in  Jambi are much more homogeneous than in the other two
provinces.  Associations  to  which  Protestant  households  belong  are  the  most
heterogeneous.  The index follows a U-shaped pattern in relation to education and income
quintile:  Heterogeneity rises with education and with income except at the very bottom
of the distribution.
9  We  also considered alternative weighting schemes:  (i) weights based on  a  principal
component analysis of the heterogeneity  criteria; and (ii) giving larger weights to  the
economic criteria (occupation,  economic status, education) on the assumption that  an
association of  people with e.g. different occupations  presents greater opportunities for
information  sharing than e.g. a group with different ages.  The empirical results on the
importance of the heterogeneity  index were not  altered substantively by changing the
weights.  We are grateful  to Jonathan  Isham and Michael Woolcock  for having suggested
these alternatives  and for helpful  discussions  on the issue of heterogeneity.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  17
It is not immediately obvious whether a high degree of internal heterogeneity is a
positive or negative factor from the point of view of social capital.  One could argue that
an internally homogeneous association will make it easier for members to trust  each
other, to share information and to reach decisions.1 0 On the other hand, they may also
have  similar  information  so  that  less  is  gained  from  exchanging  information.
Furthermore,  the  coexistence  of  a  series  of  associations which  are  each  internally
homogenous, but along different criteria, could render the decision making process at the
village level more difficult.  The heterogeneity index will allow us to assess empirically
the impact of this factor.
(3)  Meeting attendance. A priori, it would appear that membership in an association
is of little value if one does not attend the rneetings with the other group members.  We
therefore constructed a meeting attendance index which measures the average number of
times someone from the household attended group meetings, normalized for the number
of memberships of each household.
For each membership in an association, the average sample household attends 6.0
meetings in a three-month period. This figure, however, is slightly higher in Jambi (6.8),
which is probably the flip side of the lower number of memberships in that province.
Presumably if one is a member of fewer associations, it is possible to go more frequently
to  their  meetings.  This  is  also  reflected by  the religious dimension  since Catholic
households, who are members of more associations, attend each one's meetings less
10  Evidence  indicates that homogeneity  facilitates  the adoption of new technology (Rogers,
1995;  Isham, 1998).Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  18
frequently than households of other religions.  Meeting attendance follows an inverted
U-pattern with  respect to  income and  education:  people with primary or vocational
education, and those in the second expenditure quantile attend meetings most frequently.
(4)  Decision making index.  It has been argued that associations which follow a
democratic  pattern  of  decision  making  are  more  effective  than  others.  The  LLI
questionnaire asked association members to  evaluate subjectively whether they  were
"very active"  "somewhat active" or "not very active" in the group's  decision making.
This response was scaled from 2 to 0 respectively, and averaged across the three most
important groups in each household. The resulting index was re-scaled from 0 to 100.
The index of active participation in decision making is significantly higher in
NTT than in the other two provinces (Table 2).  It is also higher for male-headed than
female-headed households.  There is a very pronounced pattern of rising participation in
decision making  with  level  of  education and  income.  Thus,  the poorest  and  least
educated households participate less actively in the decision making of the associations of
which they are a member.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  19
Table 2:  Social Capital Dimensions, by Region and Household Characteristics
Memberships  Index  of  Meeting  Index  of
lleterogeneity  Attendance  Participation
in Decision
l_________  _  |  Making
Province
Jambi  3.7  38.9  6.8  63.5
Jawa Tengah  6.0  57.6  6.0  55.6
NTT  6.5  61.6  5.2  71.4
Head of Household
Male  5.5  53.6  6.0  64.1
Female  4.6  49.2  5.9  57.1
Religion
Muslim  4.9  49.2  6.3  59.5
Catholic  8.3  58.7  4.8  71.6
Protestant  4.7  63.7  5.7  70.7
Education of Head of
Household
None  4.5  52.5  5.5  53.5
Primary  School  - 5.2  51.5  6.0  60.0
Incomplete
Primary  School  - 5.7  53.0  6.4  65.7
Complete
Secondary  School-  6.0  54.1  5.7  68.3
Incomplete
Secondary  School  - 6.6  64.0  4.3  72.9
Complete
Vocational  4.8  59.2  6.5  83.3
University/Other  8.3  51.9  3.0  77.5
Quintile of Household
Expenditure  Per Capita
Poorest  5.4  52.9  5.7  55.0
2  5.5  50.9  7.0  64.5
3  5.4  51.9  6.2  65.0
4  5.4  54.6  5.8  66.6
Richest  5.6  56.2  5.1  66.5
All  5.5  53.3  6.0  63.5
Note:  Variable  definitions  are (for details,  see text):
*  memberships:  average  number  of active  memberships  per household
*  index of heterogeneity: scale (0-100) of intemnal  heterogeneity  of the three most
important  groups,  according  to eight criteria
*  meeting  attendance:  average  number  of times a household  member  attended  a group
meeting  in the last  three months,  nonnalized  for the number  of memberships
*  index of participation  in decision imaking: scale (0 to  100) of extent of active
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Table 2 (Continued): Social Capital Dimensions,
by Region and Household Characteristics
Cash  Work  Community
l___________________________________  Contribution  Contribution  Orientation
Province
Jambi  2,331  1.0  62.2
Jawa Tengah  2,507  12.7  48.0
NTT  2,433  67.7  49.5
Head of Household
Male  2,439  28.9  52.1
Female  2,289  20.2  61.8
Religion
Muslim  2,477  7.2  54.4
Catholic  3,757  67.8  54.6
Protestant  751  69.6  44.8
Education of Head of Household
None  1,411  22.5  55.8
Primary School-  Incomplete  1,910  19.3  55.1
Primary School - Complete  2,615  32.3  53.2
Secondary School - Incomplete  2,908  41.9  46.0
Secondary School - Complete  5,720  46.2  45.9
Vocational  2,423  15.4  48.9
University/Other  2,580  36.3  44.4
Quintile of Household Expenditure Per
Capita
Poorest  1,519  39.5  51.9
2  2,378  28.5  55.1
3  2,887  29.2  54.3
4  1,760  20.6  52.1
Richest  3,588  23.2  51.1
All  2,427  28.2  52.9
Note continued:
*  Cash contribution:  amount of fees (Rupiabs per month) paid for memberships in the three
most important groups.
*  Work contribution:  number of days worked per year as membership contribution in the
three most important groups.
*  Community orientation:  percent of memberships in organizations which are community-
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(5)  Membership dues.  All  other things being equal, it is presumably  a  sign of
greater interest in the association if one is willing to pay membership dues.  Only 30% of
memberships in our sample involved payment of such fees, which on average amounted
to 2,427 Rupiahs per month (Table 2).  The amount paid rises quite sharply with level of
education  and income.  In  addition, about 30% of  households also  provide  a  labor
contribution, which on average amounts to 28 days per year.  This practice is largely
confined however to NTT, where it averages 68 days per year.  Labor contributions fall
quite steeply with rising income level.
(6)  Community  orientation.  Many  case  studies  on  the  functioning  of  local
associations  have  argued  that  voluntary  organizations that  find  their  roots  in  the
community are more effective than externally imposed and/or mandated groups (Uphoff,
1992; Narayan, 1995; Ostrom, 1995).  In the three Indonesian study provinces, slightly
more than  half of all memberships are in  organizations which were  initiated  by the
community (Table 2).  This community orientation is much higher though  in  Jambi.
Female-headed households also tend to join community-initiated groups more frequently
than male-headed households.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  22
4.  Household Welfare and Social Capital: The Aggregate Model
The basic question to be addressed is:  Are households with high levels of social
capital better off?  Table 3 provides a descriptive answer.  We grouped households in
quintiles  based  on  their  ranking  on  an  additive social  capital  index.  Anticipating
somewhat our regression results, we selected the number of memberships and the index
of active participation in decision making to construct (with equal weights) an additive
social capital index."  It turns out that households with higher social capital have higher
household expenditure per capita, more assets, better access to credit and more likely to
have increased their savings in the past year.  They are also  less likely to have their
children not attend school.  There was no relation between the level of social capital and
the need to sell assets to make ends meet or to  go hungry.  While the strength of the
correlation between social capital and welfare outcomes differs by indicator, the overall
pattern is quite strong:  social capital correlates positively with household welfare.
An alternative  additive  index  based on all seven,  equally  weighted,  social capital  dimensions
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Table 3:  Household Welfare Indicators, by Levels of Social Capital
Social  Capital  Quintiles 1'
1  2  3  |  4  |  5  All
(Poorest)  (Richest)
Household Expenditure per Capita  498.0  560.8  537.4  569.0  572.5  547.5
('000 Rupiahs per year)
Asset Index2'  0.43  0.58  0.60  0.68  0.51  0.56
% of Children Not Attending School  19.5  17.2  11.9  14.1  13.6  15.1
% of Households Going Hungry  11.9  7.9  8.3  9.7  9.2  9.4
% of Households with Access to  57.3  59.9  60.1  64.3  64.5  61.2
Credit
Amount of Credit Received  158.0  366.6  685.0  918.0  502.8  534.7
('000  Rupiah)
% of Households with Increased  12.8  11.5  20.6  16.3  21.5  16.5
Savings in Past Year
% of Households with Forced  26.9  16.3  29.8  22.9  35.1  26.2
Asset Sales
Notes:  1.  Households were grouped in quintiles boased  on their ranking on the social capital index calculated as
the average of the number of memberships and the index of participation in decision making.
2.  The asset index ranges from 0 to 3 anid  is based on a principal component analysis of household
ownership of 15 durable goods (car, boat, stereo system, etc.).
A conventional model of household economic behavior can readily be adjusted to
reflect the role of social capital. Such a modlel  consists of three sets of equations:
a  The first  set of  equations explains the income generation behavior of  the
household  and  describes  how  the  household  combines  its  various  asset
endowments  to  make  decisions  regarding  labor  supply  for  each  of  its
members, taking the wage rates and demand situation in the labor market as
given.  In this formulation, social capital can be considered as one among
several classes of assets available to  the household  to make  its decisions.
Social  capital  is  combined wilh  human  capital,  physical  capital  and  the
ownership of land to make productive decisions.
*  The second  set  of  equations portrays  the  household's  demand  for  inputs
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be combined with labor supply in order to generate income.  Here too, social
capital is one category of capital which detennines these decisions.
*  A third set of equations explains the households'  consumption and savings
behavior as a function of the level and composition of income.
The  customary  reduced-form  model  of  these  structural  equations  relates
household expenditure directly to the exogenous asset endowment of the household and
yields the following estimating equation:' 2
MnE,  = a +  /iSCi  + HC, +±3OC 1+ -i  +  qZi +  ui  (1)
Where  E,  =  household expenditure per capita of household i
SC,  =  household endowment of social capital
HC,  =  household endowment of human capital
OCi  =  household endowment of other assets
Xi  =  a vector of household characteristics
Zi  =  a vector of village/region characteristics
u;  =  error term
The  key  feature  of  this  model  is  the  assumption that  social  capital is  truly
"capital" and hence has a measurable return to the household.  Social capital has many
"capital" features:  it requires resources (especially time) to be produced and it is subject
to accumulation and decumulation. 13 Social capital can be acquired in formal or informal
settings, just  like human capital (e.g., schools versus learning-by-doing).  Much social
capital is built during interactions which occur for social, religious, or cultural reasons.
12  This reduced-form  model was also the basis for the earlier cited study by Narayan and
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This is reflected clearly in the pattern of associational memberships in Indonesia, where
almost  one  half  of  all  memberships  are  groups which  pursue  social,  religious  or
recreational purposes.  On the other side of the spectrum are the government-sponsored
associations,  with  mandatory  membership,  where  interactions  occur  in  a  formal
framework.  The key assumption is that the networks built through these interactions
have measurable benefits to the participating individuals, and lead, directly or indirectly,
to a higher level of well-being.  This is the proposition which we test empirically in this
paper by means of equation  (1).  Structurally, the  returns to  social capital could be
measured in the earnings functions if, e.g., one's network helps in getting better-paying
jobs  or promotions.  It could also  show up in the various fimctions which deterrnine
access to credit, agricultural inputs or other factors which enhance the productivity of a
household enterprise.  In the estimations below, we will focus on one such input, namely
credit.  14
The dependent variable of  equation (1) is the natural logarithm of household
expenditure per capita.'5 The explanatory variables consist of the asset endowment of the
household, demographic control variables, and locational dummy variables.  Household
assets are assumed to consist of human capital, social capital, land, and physical assets.
We have already discussed in the previouis section the variables used to  measure the
13  Events in transition  economies  such as Russia  and former  Yugoslavia  are powerful  evidence
of the effects  of the decumulation  of social  capital  (Rose,  1995).
14  If equation  (1) is estimated  over  households,  there is an implicit  assumption  that social capital
is embodied  in the members  of the household. This conforms  to the position  advocated  by
Portes (1998),  who highlights  that, although  the source of social capital is the relationships
among  a group of individuals,  the capital itself is an individual  asset.  This is in contrast  to
e.g. the position  of Putnam  who sees  social  capital  as a collective  asset (Portes,  1998).
5  This variable was constructed in nominal form.  It is recognized  that there might be a
significant  amount  of regional price variation  in Indonesia. As of writing we do not have
access  to a regional  price index  to deflate  household  expenditure  per capita. We assume  that
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household's endowment of social capital.  Human capital is measured conventionally by
the years of education of the adult members of the household.'6 The LLI study data set
contains information on land, cattle and farm equipment owned by the household.  Direct
inclusion of these variables as regressors in equation (1) is problematic due to possible
endogeneity.  Indeed, as Table 3  indicated, 26% of households sold assets to pay  for
consumption expenditures.  Unfortunately, the data do not contain the stock of assets at
the beginning of the consumption reference period.  For that reason, we chose not to
include the  asset variables  as regressors.  Instead, we  created a  dummy variable to
indicate whether  the head  of  households was  a  farner.  This must  be  seen  as  an
occupational variable as well as a proxy for ownership of agricultural assets.'7
In addition, the regressions include demographic variables, such as household size
and gender of the head of household.  Age of the head of household and its squared term
were  included  to  capture  the  life cycle  of  household welfare.  Lastly, two  dummy
variables  were  included to  indicate province  (Jambi was  used  as omitted  category).
These variables capture the general economic and social conditions of the provinces
along dimensions other than those which we were able to include in the model.18
The first column in Table 4 replicates, as far as the data permit, the model that
was used by Narayan and Pritchett (1997) for Tanzania.  It  consists of one aggregate
social capital index, which is a multiplicative index between the density of associations,
their internal heterogeneity and the index of active participation in decision making.  The
16  The LLI questionnaire  recorded  only the level of educational  achievement  of each  adult in the
household  and the number  of years of education  was imputed  from that information.
17  In order to assess the impact  of this decision,  we re-estimated  all equations  reported in this
paper  with three asset  variables  capturing  ownership  of land,  cattle and farm equipment.  The
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model results suggest that human capi.tal  as well as social capital each have a significant
positive effect on household welfare.  However, one of the remarkable findings of the
Narayan-Pritchett study was the large magnitude of the social capital effect:  depending
upon the specification, the social capital effect in Tanzania was found to be 4-10 times
larger than the human capital effect.  Although the results for Indonesia imply a larger
effect from social capital than from humani  capital, the difference is not as large as in the
case of Tanzania.
Table 4:  Household Welfare and Social Capital: The Aggregate Model
Narayan-Plritchett  Modified  Specification
Specification  Specification  without
Social Capital
Intercept  13.3158  (181.04)  12.7948  (69.65)  12.6782  (67.59)
Social  Capital  Index  0.0066  (6.29)  0.0069  (6.52)  - _
Household Size  -0.0998  (11.01)  -0.0972  (10.23)  -0.0923  (9.59)
Years  of Education  per  Adult  0.0144  (1.96)  0.0343  (4.49)  0.0454  (6.11)
Female  Head of Household  -0.0004  (0.01)  -0.0463  (0.67)  -0.0551  (0.81)
Age  of Head  of  Household  - _  0.0309  (3.75)  0.0354  (4.20)
Age  of  Head  of  Household  Squared  _  - -0.0003  (3.30)  -0.0003  (3.71)
Household  Asset  Score  0.3144  (9.32)  - -
Farmer  Household  -0.1249  (3.03)  -0.2311  (5.73)  -0.2417  (5.89)
Jawa Tengah  -0.0681  (1.73)  -0.1630  (3.90)  -0.0987  (2.40)
Nusa Tenggara  Timur  -0.1307  (2.72)  -0.3271  (7.24)  -0.2201  (5.21)
Number  of Observations  1137  1137  1137
R-squared  0.28  0.24  0.21
F-statistic  48.4  33.6  31.3
Notes: 1. Dependent  variable  = ln  (household  expenditure  per  capita)
2. t-statistics  are  in parentheses  and  are  based  on robust  standard  errors  (Hubert-White  estimator  for
non-identically  distributed  residuals)
Furthermore, the results may be unduly influenced by the presence in Narayan
and Pritchett's  equation of an asset variable which includes several consumer durable
goods.  This is arguably endogenous in a model where total expenditure is the dependent
variable.  The asset variable is also correlated positively with education.  This is readily
apparent if  we  drop the asset variable fiom the  RHS of  the equation  (column  2 of
18  Means  and standard  deviations  of regression  variables  are reported  in Annex  Table 9.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  28
Table 4).  The effect is that the coefficient of education increases by a factor of almost
2.5.  The results now imply similar returns to human and social capital.  A 10% increase
in the household's human capital endowment would lead to an increase in expenditure of
1.65%, against  a  1.18% increase  stemming from  a  10% increase  in  social  capital
endowment.  In view of the endogeneity problem of the asset variable, we opt to retain
the modified  specification (which drops the durable-goods variable and  adds the age
variable to capture life cycle) for the rest of this paper.
The relative importance of social capital can be further understood by comparing
the model with and without the social capital variable (columns 2 and  3 in Table 4).
Including social capital increases the R-squared from 0.21 to 0.24.  More importantly, it
reduces the coefficient of human capital by about one-third.  This suggests that at least
some  of  the  human  capital  effects  operates  through  the  networks  and  associations
captured in the social capital index.  In other words, there is some empirical validity to
the proposition "It's  whom you know, not what you know".  However, our results also
suggest that a better formulation might be "It's whom you know and what you know".
In addition to the estimated effects from human and social capital endowments,
the  model  results  show  that  household  welfare  is  also  influenced  strongly  by  the
household's  demographic characteristics and location.  Larger households have lower
welfare and there is a life cycle effect of rising household welfare up to age 55.  The
results  also  indicate that  female-headed households,  after controlling  for their  asset
endowments,  do  not  have  a  lower  level  of  household  welfare  than  male-headed
households.  Farmer households, on the other hand, do have on average a 23% lower
welfare level.  Since this  variable captures essentially the  difference between  havingSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  29
income  from  agricultural  activities and  that  from  wage  earnings as  main  source  of
income, it indicates that wage jobs yield on average higher incomes.
Lastly, the two provincial dummy variables indicate that households with equal
assets and other characteristics will on average have expenditure per capita levels that are
16% lower in  Jawa Tengah  and  33% lower  in  NTT  than  in  Jambi.  The  negative
coefficient associated with Jawa Tengah is at first sight surprising since this province has
a higher average expenditure level than Jambi.  The explanation is that Jawa Tengah has
higher levels of human and social capital than Jambi (see Table 1), and after controlling
for this difference, a negative location premium remains.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  30
5.  Household Welfare, Poverty and Social Capital:  Disaggregating
the Social Capital Index
While  it  is  certainly a  relevant finding that social  capital has  returns  to  the
household that are similar in magnitude to those from human capital, it provides little
guidance  as to  which aspect of social capital produces this  result.  In section 3, we
discussed  six  dimensions  of  social  capital  which  are  indicators  of  the  degree  of
participation in local associational life.  The aggregate index used in the previous section
was based on three of those dimensions, which were assumed to interact with one another
in  a  multiplicative way.  This  implies,  for  example, that  heterogeneity  or  internal
functioning may have different effects depending upon the number of associations of
which the household is a member.
However, it is also possible to consider that each social capital dimension acts
independently, and that the effects  are additive.  The conceptual literature on  social
capital is not advanced to the stage that theoretical arguments can be put forth to select
one approach over the other.  Hence, we test in this section the additive model, whereby
the regression results themselves determine the relative weight of each dimension.  To
that  effect,  we  replace  in  the  model  the  aggregate social  capital  index with  seven
variables capturing the six dimensions of social capital (membership contributions are
captured  by  two  variables-cash  and  work  contributions).' 9 The  regression  results
suggest that the number of memberships, the internal heterogeneity of the associations,
19  These variables  are the same indicators  shown in Table  2, except that we re-scaled  the two
membership  fee variables  (in cash and in kind) to an index  ranging  from 0 to 100 in order to
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the degree of active participation in decision making and the extent of payment of dues in
cash are the most important aspects (Table 5).
Indonesian households on average belong to 5.5 associations.  The coefficient of
the membership variable indicates that an additional membership is associated with a
1.5% higher  household  expenditure level.  In  the  context  of  the  model  which  we
discussed in section 3, this is interpreted as the economic return to memberships in local
associations.20 We already alluded to the possibility of reverse causation:  high income
households could have a higher demand for associational life, perhaps because they have
more leisure  (although the opportunity cost  of their time  is also  higher).  One  can
certainly argue that associational life has a consumption value and is not sought merely
for its economic benefits.  Clearly, this is related to the type of association:  participating
in church choir may have more consumption value than joining the farmers' cooperative.
In section 7, we distinguish different types of organizations, and in section  8 we address
formally the question of reverse causation vwith  instrumental variables.
20  There is a close parallel in the interpretation  of the coefficients  of human and social capital
variables. The former  represent  the return  to years of investment  in education  through  school
attendance. In the case of social capital, the main input is also time, and the coefficient
measures the returns to  that time  spent in  developing networks, attending association
meetings,  etc. This time can indeed  be spread  over many  years.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  32
Table 5:  Household Welfare and Social Capital:
Disaggregating the Social Capital Index
Intercept  12.5318  (64.66)
Social  Capital  Dimensions
Number  of Memberships  0.0146  (2.43)
Heterogeneity  Index  0.0031  (3.16)
Meeting  Attendance  -0.0020  (0.81)
Index of Participation  in Decision  Making  0.0025  (4.29)
Cash Contribution  Score  0.0113  (1.46)
Work Contribution  Score  -0.0008  (0.27)
Community  Orientation  0.0000  (0.01)
Household  Size  -0.0947  (9.87)
Years of Education  0.0322  (4.22)
Female  Head of Household  -0.0303  (0.44)
Age of Head of Household  0.0298  (3.62)
Age of Head  of Household  Squared  -0.0003  (3.15)
Farmer  Household  -0.2182  (5.23)
Jawa Tengah  -0.1686  (3.56)
Nusa Tenggara  Timur  -0.3446  (6.17)
Number  of Observations  1137
R-squared  0.25
F-statistic  21.7
Notes: 1. Dependent  variable  = In (household  expenditure  per capita).
2. t-statistics are in parentheses  and are based on robust standard  errors
(Hubert-White  estimator  for non-identically  distributed  residuals).
Table 5 suggests that the benefits from participating in internally heterogeneous
associations are higher than from  associations whose members are more alike.  The
reasons for this may have to do with the exchanges of knowledge and information that
occur among members.  Members from different backgrounds may learn more from each
other  because  they  have  different  knowledge to  start  with.  A  further  analysis  of
heterogeneity  (by  including  each  dimension  as  a  separate  regressor  in  the  model)
supported  this  conclusion:  the  economic dimensions of  heterogeneity  (occupation,
economic status and education) matter the most.  In other words, associations where
members  differ  in  economic attributes  yield  more  benefits  to  their  members  than
associations where members differ primarily in demographic attributes.  Location also
matters:  benefits are greater if the association brings together  people from differentSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  33
neighborhoods.  Differences in location and economic characteristics indeed maximize
the chance that association members have different knowledge and hence maximize the
potential gain from exchange.
As the literature on social capital has often argued, for local associations to be
effective, members must participate actively. Our results suggest that this is not achieved
per se by attending meetings (which in Indonesia is often obligatory) but by participating
actively in the decision making process.  Households that do so are presumably better
able to reap the benefits from the associations.  The coefficient of this variable is quite
large:  a  10 point increase in the active participation score (which is a  15% increase)
corresponds with a 2.5% higher expenditare level-a  larger effect than from adding a
membership.
A surprising result is the insignificance of the community orientation variable.
This suggests that, for a given degree of active participation, internal heterogeneity, etc.,
it does not matter whether an association is locally initiated or imposed from the outside.
The reason for this  could be that community initiation affects household welfare only
indirectly, by making active participation rnore likely.  The analysis in section 7 suggests
that  locally initiated production and social associations are indeed characterized by a
higher degree of active participation.
So  far,  we  have  provided  evidence that  social  capital,  and  specifically  the
dimensions relating to active participation in decision making and internal heterogeneity,
have  positive  effects  on  household  welfare.  However,  since  equation  (1)  imposes
constant parameters over the entire distribution, the results do not  say whether social
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capital can help escaping from poverty.  In this context, it is important to note that the
ownership of social capital (as measured by the interactive social capital index) is fairly
equally distributed:  the social capital index for the richest quintile is only about 30%
higher than for the poorest quintile-about  the same degree of inequality as for years of
education.  Physical assets are distributed much more unequally, especially land and
household durables (animal ownership is only weakly related to income, and ownership
of farm equipment, which is very low overall, declines with income level).
Table 6:  Ownership of Assets, by Quintile of Household Expenditure per Capita
Quintiles| 
I  |~~~~~~~~~~~  2  |  3  |  4  |  5  lAll
(Poorest)  2IQ(Richest)  Al
Social Capital Index  14.99  16.65  16.65  18.00  19.89  17.23
Years of Education  4.32  4.64  4.59  5.04  5.65  4.85
Land Ownership (hectares)  1.45  1.28  1.96  3.90  2.52  2.17
Animal Ownership (number)  4.64  3.22  3.42  3.14  4.88  3.86
Fann Equipment Ownership  0.71  0.69  0.67  0.64  0.55-  0.65
(number)  I
Household Durables (number)  1.25  1.76  2.13  2.69  3.07  2.18
The question remains however whether this relative accumulation of social capital
assets by the poor is rational, in the sense that indeed it helps them escape from poverty
or at least provides them with relatively higher returns than other assets.  We address this
question in several ways. First, we estimate a probit model of the likelihood to be poor.21
The results indicate that social capital can significantly reduce the probability to be poor
(Table 7).  The average household with 5.5 memberships has a 7.26 percentage points
lower probability to be  poor than a household with no  memberships.  In  contrast, a
household with an average education level (4.8 years per adult) reduces its probability to
be poor by 6.0% relative to a household with no education.  This suggests that investing
21  The  poverty  line  was set at two-thirds  of mean household  expenditure  per capita.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  35
in  social capital  is a  sensible strategy ]for poor households.  Active participation  in
decision making and  memberships in  heterogeneous organizations further reduce  the
likelihood to be poor.  The economic dimensions of heterogeneity dominated this result.
However,  memberships  in  associations  that  bring  together  people  from  different
neighborhoods and kin groups also reduce the probability to be poor.
Quantile regressions are a further way to  explore differences between the poor
and the rich in the role of social capital.  Quantile regressions estimate the regression line
through  given  points  on  the  distribution of  the  dependent variable  (whilst  an  OLS
regression line goes through the mean) and can assess whether certain explanatory factors
are weaker or stronger in different parts of the distribution.  However, the estimation is
conditional upon the, values of the independent variables and hence coefficients from
quantile regressions are not comparable wilth  those of OLS regressions. 22
22  Specifically,  the coefficients  show  the effect of a marginal  change  in an explanatory  variable
on the xth  conditional  quantile  of the dependent  variable  (Buchinsky,  1998).Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  36
Table 7:  Social Capital and Poverty Outcomes
Impact  on Probability  to be Poor
(probit) 1'
Social Capital  Dimensions
Number  of Memberships  -0.0132  (3.21)
Heterogeneity  Index  -0.0018  (2.73)
Meeting  Attendance  -0.0011  (0.62)
Index of Participation  in Decision  Making  -0.0017  (4.76)
Cash Contribution  Score  0.0041  (0.56)
Work Contribution  Score  0.0003  (0.17)
Community  Orientation  0.0002  (0.45)
Household  Size  0.0419  (7.04)
Years of Education  -0.0126  (2.32)
Female  Head of Household  0.0144  (0.32)
Age of Head of Household  -0.0079  (1.51)
Age of Head of Household  Squared  0.0000  (1.34)
Farmer  Household  0.0567  (1.84)
Jawa Tengah  0.1820  (4.58)
Nusa Tenggara  Timur  0.3240  (7.01)
Number  of Observations  1137
Log Likelihood  -461.6
Chi-squared  164.0
Probability  > Chi-squared  0.00
Note: 1.  Probability  derivatives  at the mean  of each explanatory  variable  (or for 0 to 1
change  for dummy  variables)  and z-scores  based  on robust  standard  errors.
Quantile estimation of equation (1) indicates that the returns to social capital, as
measured  by  the  aggregate  social  capital  index, are  highest  at  the  bottom  of  the
distribution and  gradually decline until the 75th percentile (Table 8).  This pattern  is
primarily influenced by the index of participation in decision making.  This suggests that
the poorest  households in  Indonesia benefit the  most  from high  participation in  the
decision making of associations (and confirms the results of the probit model in Table 7).
The effects of membership per se and of heterogeneity are concentrated in the range of
the 25th percentile to the median.  It is interesting that the cash contribution score is only
significant at the 90b percentile, suggesting that the rich "buy"  their way into social
capital.  The pattern  of the coefficients of the  work contribution score  is the  exact
opposite, suggesting that the poor have to work their way into social capital.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  37
Table 8:  Poverty and Social Capital: Quanfile Regression Results
i  25th  Median  75t  gotn
I________________________________________  percentile  percentile  percentile  percentile
Social Capital Index  0.0096*  0.0090*  0.0078*  0.0048*  0.0049*
Number of Memberships  0.01  66*  0.0213*  0.0208*  0.0078  0.0106
Heterogeneity Index  0.0018  0.0044*  0.0043*  0.0022  0.0034*
Meeting Attendance  0.0013  -0.0005  -0.0025  -0.0027  -0.0032
Index of Participation in Decision Making  0.0047*  0.0023*  0.0023*  0.0018*  0.0018*
Cash Contribution Score  0.0145  0.0110  0.0117  0.0150  0.0201*
Work Contribution Score  0.0057  0.0025  0.0004  -0.0040  -0.0053
|  Community Orientation  0.0004  0.0001  0.0002  -0.0003  0.0001
Years of Education  0.02'85*  0.0312*  0.0290*  0.0396*  0.0519*
Note:  Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 90% confidence level.
The contrast between the pattern of returns to social capital with that of human
capital is remarkable: the returns to education get larger as one moves up the distribution
and are almost twice as high at the 90th  percentile than at the 1Oth  percentile.  In terms of
relative returns, one can indeed say that social capital is the capital of the poor.
The third and final method we use to  investigate differential returns to  social
capital between the poor and the non-poor is the split-sample approach.  However, we
cannot simply split the sample at the poverty line, or use  a  conventional interaction
variable between the regressors and  the  poverty status variable (which  is equivalent
econometrically), because the latter is endogenous.  Indeed, the poverty line is defined in
terms of household expenditure per capita--the  dependent variable of the model.  Hence
we need to split the sample on the basis of exogenous assets.  In the context of a poor
rural area, land holdings is an obvious choice.  We split the sample into households
below and above the median land holding 23, and  estimated equation (1) on each half
sample (Table 9).  The returns to the aggregate social capital index are slightly higher for
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that this  is the result of two partly offsetting effects.  Benefits from membership and
heterogeneity  are  larger  for  households with  less  land,  while  benefits  from  active
participation in decision making are higher for well-landed households.  24
Table 9: Poverty and Social Capital: Split-Sample Results
Below Median  1  Above Median
Landholdings  Landholdings
Social Capital Index  0.0067*  0.0059*
Number of Memberships  0.0176*  0.0078
Heterogeneity Index  0.0036*  0.0023
Meeting Attendance  -0.0020  -0.0005
Index of Participation in Decision Making  0.0011*  0.0040*
Cash Contribution Score  0.0057  0.0159
Work Contribution Score  0.0040  -0.0071
Community Orientation  0.0001  0.0004
Note: Asterisk (*) indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the
90% confidence level.
On  balance,  the  results  of  this  section  indicate  that  memberships  in  local
associations contribute to higher household welfare levels and to reducing the probability
to be poor.  The key dimensions are internal heterogeneity and active participation in
decision making.  Returns to social capital are generally higher for households in the
lower half of the distribution, whether by expenditure per capita or land ownership.
23  Due to widely  different  absolute  levels  of land ownership  across  the three provinces,  the split
was done within  each province  using  provincial  medians.
24  This last finding appears to be at odds with the results from the quantile regressions.
However,  there is no close correlation  between  the distribution  of expenditure  per capita  and
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6.  The  Effects  of  Social  Capital:  Asset  Accumulation,  Access  to
Credit, Collective Action
Why are households interested in acquiring social capital by investing time and
money in  local associations?  In Indonesia, the partial answer is that the government
created many nationwide associations with mandatory membership.  However, Indonesia
also has a strong local tradition of mutual help and associational life to support it.  The
survey questionnaires of the LLI study provide insights into why households join local
associations.  Only 17% of households cite mandatory memberships as the prime reason.
The  other  responses  are  about  equally  divided  between  the  direct  impact  on  the
household's  livelihood, the impact on the community, and safeguards in case of future
emergency or need (Grootaert, 1999).
In this section we investigate some of these processes directly.  In a relatively
poor rural setting, a prime consideration for households is to build up coping strategies to
deal with the risk of income fluctuations.  This  involves accumulating assets (which can
be sold or borrowed against in time of need) or arranging access to credit.  In the rural
areas that are included in this study, asset accumulation is still at a low level.  Out of a list
of  15 household durable goods, the average household owned only 2.2 items.  Most
frequently owned were a radio, a pressure lamp and a bicycle. Improving access to credit
and savings is a major reason why Indonesian households join local associations.  One-
fifth of all memberships are primarily for Ihis purpose, with a stronger concentration in
Jawa Tengah which has a tradition of rotaLting  credit and saving associations (Werner,
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6.1  Asset Accumulation
To see whether social capital is effective in contributing to asset accumulation, we
re-estimated equation (1) with an asset score variable as dependent variable.  Since the
data do not contain price infornation,  this score was calculated using weights derived
from a  principal component analysis of the  15 durable goods (Filmer and  Pritchett,
1998).25 The results indicate that the number of memberships is not significant, but that
belonging to internally heterogeneous associations and participating actively in them is
linked with higher asset ownership (Column 1, Table 10). These are, of course, the same
two  characteristics of associations which we found important earlier as correlates for
current expenditure.
The effects are similar in magnitude as in the case of current expenditure-a  10%
increase in the heterogeneity index or in the participation index increases asset ownership
by 1.7-2.0%. For comparison, a 10% increase in human capital endowment corresponds
to a 4.6% higher asset ownership.  In other words, while social capital plays a positive
role in asset accumulation by the household, its importance relative to education is less
than was the case for current expenditure.
25  We also used  equal weights  and weights  which  reflected  the relative  scarcity  of ownership  of
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Table  10:  Social Capital  and Asset Accumulation
Asset Ownership!'  Increasing Savings2'
Intercept  -0.1972  (1.26)  - _
Social Capital Dimensions
Number of Memberships  0.0023  (0.50)  0.0101  (2.86)
Membership in Financial Associations  - 0.0594  (2.13)
Heterogeneity Index  0.0018  (2.23)  0.0002  (0.31)
Meeting Attendance  0.0002  (0.08)  -0.0044  (1.85)
Index of Participation in Decision Making  0.0018  (4.30)  0.0003  (0.80)
Cash Contribution Score  -0.0025  (0.44)  0.0009  (0.21)
Work Contribution Score  0.0007  (0.38)  -0.0019  (1.09)
Community Orientation  -0.0006  (0.93)  -0.0007  (1.49)
Household Size  0.0243  (3.61)  -0.0009  (0.18)
Years of Education  0.0527  (7.83)  -0.0024  (0.50)
Asset Score  - 0.0497  (2.22)
Female Head of Household  -0.0909  (1.87)  0.0231  (0.59)
Age of Head of Household  0.0280  (4.28)  -0.0057  (1.13)
Age of Head of Household Squared  -0.0002  (3.42)  0.0000  (0.81)
Farmer Household  -0.3116  (7.74)  -0.0631  (2.21)
Jawa Tengah  -0.2092  (4.72)  0.2267  (5.13)
Nusa Tenggara Timur  -0.6212  (13.37)  0.1161  (2.70)
Number of Observations  1137  1137
R-squared  0.37  _
F-statistic  46.8  _
Log Likelihood  _  -430.3
Chi-squared  140.7
Probability > Chi-squared  0.00
Notes: 1. OLS model with  asset score (principal component weights)  as dependent variable;
reported are coefficients and t-values based on robust standard errors.
2.  Probit  model of  households who  increased savings  in the  past  year;  reported  are
probability derivatives at the mean of the explanatory variables (or for 0 to I change in
the case of dummy variables) and z-srores based on robust standard errors.
Another  aspect  of asset  accumulation  is  the  ability  to  have  savings.  While  the
LLI  questionnaire  did not record  the  amount  of  savings,  it did ask  whether  households
had  been  able to increase  savings  in the past  year.  Households  with  more  memberships
in  local  associations  were  significantly  more  able  to  do  so  than  others  (Column 2,
Table  10).  The  effect  was  especially  strong  from  memberships  in  credit  and  savings
associations  indicating  that  such  organizations  do  in  fact  achieve  their  professed
objective.  The  initial  wealth  position  of  the  household  also  mattered,  as  richerSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  42
households were significantly more likely to increase their savings.  This underscores of
course the importance of credit and savings associations for the poor.
6.2  Access to Credit
Table 11 confirms the importance of financial associations for access to credit:
members were 13 percentage points more likely to obtain credit than non-members and
the obtained credit amounts were much larger.  However, Table 11 also makes it clear
that  membership  and  active  participation in  other local  associations,  whose  prime
objective is not financial, also contributes to access to credit. This is perhaps the sense in
which social capital is truly "social," in that the building of networks and trust among
members in the context of a social setting spills over into financial benefits, e.g. by easier
access to  credit.  This interpretation of  social capital has  been proposed by  several
authors such as Putnam (1993), Dasgupta (1988) and Fukuyama (1995).  Sharma and
Zeller (1997) report that the number of self-help groups in communities in Bangladesh
has a positive spillover effect on the performance of credit groups.  Similar spillovers
have been documented in other sectors as well. Kahk6nen (1999) reports that community
action to  set up  water delivery systems is aided by the existence of other non-water
related networks and associations in the community.
The  results also  indicate that  internal heterogeneity of  associations improved
access to  credit.  The key  dimensions which contribute to this  effect are gender and
education.  In  other  words,  the  spillover effect  is  strongest  in  associations  whose
members  consisted  of  both  men  and  women  and  who  have  a  mixed  educational
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This leaves open the question whether heterogeneity within credit and  saving
associations is a positive factor.  The theoretical models suggest that  homogeneity of
members is preferred because it reduces information asymmetries and may make it easier
to employ social sanctions against default (Stiglitz, 1990; Devereux and  Fishe,  1993;
Besley and Coate, 1995).  Gender separation is traditional in  Indonesia in the area of
credit provision and the majority of traditional credit and saving associations (arisan) are
segregated by gender, especially in Jawa Tengah (Werner, 1998; Grootaert, 1999).  This
is in fact part of the conventional wisdom in the provision of group-based credit, not just
in  Indonesia.  For example, the Grameen Bank also insists that its borrowing circles
consists only of women (Yunus, 1997).
However, when  we  re-estimate  the models  in  Table 11  by  adding  an  index
capturing heterogeneity within credit and saving associations, the coefficient of the latter
is positive and significant.  This means that both the probability to obtain credit and the
loan amounts  received are  higher for  members  of  differentiated credit  and  savings
associations than for members of homogeneous ones.  While this is an important finding
in terms of how to best organize financial local associations, it has to be remembered that
access to credit and amounts received is only part of the story.  We have no data on
repayment records and hence it remains to be investigated whether heterogeneity is also a
positive factor for this aspect.  Evidence form Bangladesh and Madagascar suggests that
economic heterogeneity  in  the group  (especially different income  sources) improves
repayment rates because of the group's better ability to pool risk.  The effects of social
homogeneity (gender, kinship)  are mixed however (Sharma and Zeller,  1997; Zeller,
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Table 11:  Social Capital and Access to Credit
Access to Credit  Ln (Amount of
(probit) 1'  Credit Received)
(tobit) '
Intercept  _  -1.7076  (0.58)
Social Capital  Dimensions
Number of Memberships  0.0107  (1.85)  0.2089  (2.24)
Membership in Financial Associations  0.1314  (3.04)  2.2912  (3.23)
Heterogeneity Index  0.0016  (1.73)  0.0311  (2.05)
Meeting Attendance  0.0006  (0.24)  0.0235  (0.60)
Index of Participation in Decision Making  0.0011  (2.09)  0.0188  (2.28)
Cash Contribution Score  -0.0087  (1.16)  -0.1167  (0.84)
Work Contribution Score  -0.0046  (1.53)  -0.0801  (1.62)
Community Orientation  -0.0007  (1.09)  -0.0191  (1.77)
Household Size  0.0117  (1.53)  0.2344  (1.86)
Years of Education  -0.0081  (1.11)  -0.0611  (0.51)
Asset Score  -0.0194  (0.59)  0.2470  (0.46)
Female Head of Household  -0.0393  (0.69)  -0.5672  (0.60)
Age of Head of Household  0.0140  (1.91)  0.2650  (2.14)
Age of Head of Household Squared  -0.0002  (2.22)  -0.0031  (2.45)
Farmer Household  -0.0901  (2.21)  -1.7394  (2.63)
Jawa Tengah  0.0470  (0.87)  -0.0080  (0.01)
Nusa Tenggara Timur  -0.2326  (4.21)  -4.1669  (4.52)
Number of Observations  1137  1137
Log Likelihood  -686.7  -2784.3
Chi-squared  138.0  163.7
Probability > Chi-squared  0.00  0.00
Notes: 1. Probability derivatives at the mean of each explanatory variable (or for 0 to I change in
the case of dummy variables) and z-scores based on robust standard errors.
2.  Tobit coefficients and t-statistics.
6.3  Collective Action
In  addition  to  contributing  to  asset  accumulation  and  access  to  credit,  social
capital  has  also  been  documented  to  aid  in  collective  action  and  collective  decision
making.  This  is especially  relevant  in rural  settings  where  common  property  resources,
such  as water,  forestry  or grazing  land, need  to  be managed  by  a  community  (Narayan,
1995; Uphoff,  1992).  In Indonesia,  there  is a strong tradition  of mutual  help  and  quite  a
few  of the  local  associations  inventoried  by  the LLI  study  were  set up  for  that  specificSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and .Poverty in Indonesia  45
purpose.  This tradition manifests itself also in collective action (gotong ryong), often
undertaken for the purpose of constructing,  or maintaining local infrastructure.
We regressed the number of times per year households participate in collective
action  against the social capital variables and the usual  control variables  (Table 12).
Households who are members of more associations are more likely to  participate in
collective action.  This attests again to the "social" nature of social capital-networks  and
interactions engaged in as part of social, religious, financial, or other objectives spill over
into higher participation in activities which benefit the community at large.  However,
two results  are distinctly different from  what we found so far.  We have noted that
membership in internally heterogeneous organizations provides the greatest benefits to
the household, whether in terms of overall welfare, or access to credit or savings.  In the
case  of  collective action,  the  opposite  result  obtains:  the  highest  participation  in
collective action comes from members of internally more homogeneous organizations.
Further analysis indicated that kin group and religion are the key dimensions, i.e.
collective action is easiest organized in associations which brings together people from
within the same kin group and/or religion.  The importance of these factors has been
documented elsewhere.  Kahk6nen (1999) reports that homogeneity of kinship, caste and
ethnic  background aids  collective action for water supply.  The role of these  socio-
demographic factors is a noteworthy contrast with the role of the economic factors such
as education, occupation and economic status which were the key contributing factors to
increased household welfare.  Clearly, a dilferent mechanism is at work.  The benefits to
household welfare come primarily from exchanges in knowledge, while the ability to
organize collective action  is  more a  function  of trust  and  a  shared perception  of  aSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  46
common  good.  It  stands to reason  that  this  is more readily  achieved  among  people  who
are kin or share religious  convictions.
Table 12: Social Capital and Collective Action
Collective  Action 1'
Household  Village
Intercept  -11.6570  (1.41)  -43.5740  (0.29)
Social Capital  Dimensions
Number of Memberships  1.2831  (4.01)  0.0332  (0.02)
Heterogeneity Index  -0.1063  (2.42)  -0.1288  (0.44)
Meeting Attendance  -0.0358  (0.28)  -1.2797  (1.02)
Index of Participation in Decision Making  0.0172  (0.63)  0.0473  (0.21)
Cash Contribution Score  0.0135  (0.02)  -1.8735  (0.44)
Work Contribution Score  1.2161  (4.65)  4.4582  (3.60)
Community Orientation  0.0537  (1.54)  0.1190  (0.45)
Household Size  0.6247  (1.62)  7.0000  (1.54)
Years of Education  0.0231  (0.07)  -1.8229  (0.55)
Asset Score  -5.3349  (3.17)  -13.9125  (0.94)
Coefficient of Variation Expenditure  - _  -0.0632  (0.59)
Female Head of Household  -5.7515  (1.45)  21.3046  (0.47)
Age of Head of Household  0.8233  (2.28)  1.9153  (0.30)
Age of Head of Household Squared  -0.0096  (2.67)  -0.0211  (0.31)
Farmer Household  8.9465  (4.70)  14.6116  (0.76)
Jawa Tengah  15.1462  (7.00)  16.1773  (1.21)
Nusa Tenggara Timur  1.1588  (0.43)  -30.0477  (1.68)
Number of Observations  1137  48
R-squared  0.18  0.65
F-statistic  17.9  8.6
Notes: 1. Dependent variable is the  number of times  the household participated  in collective
action  (gotong  ryong)  during  the  last year.  Reported  are  OLS  coefficients  and
t-statistics based on robust standard errors.
The  second  different  finding  is  that  households  which  provide  in-kind
contributions  (i.e. through  working)  to their  associations  are more  likely  to participate  in
collective  action.  In our previous  results,  the nature  and amount  of membership  dues was
not found  to have a significant  effect.  Since in-kind  contributions  occur  almost  solely  in
NTT, this  result reflects primarily  a cultural  factor  of this province.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  47
The last noteworthy observation  from the  collective action  regression is  that
wealthier households participate less in collective action.
Given that by nature collective action is organized at the level of a community,
we also estimated the collective action regression using the village as unit of observation.
Although the regression has  a  fairly high  R-squared, most  variables  are imprecisely
estimated due to the small number of observations.  It appears that villages with a high
density of associations are not necessarily better able to organize collective action.  On
the other hand, villages where there is a tradition of paying membership dues in kind are
more successful in organizing collective action.
6.4  Household versus Village Effects
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) addressed the question whether the social capital
effects which they observed in Tanzania operate at the household or the village level.
They tested this by constructing village averages of their household-level variables and
estimating the model using the village as the unit of observation  Their results suggest
that  the social capital effect in Tanzania is primarily village-based.  We undertook a
similar exercise for Indonesia  The resulting village-level regression  as a  whole was
barely significant and the majority of variables, including the social capital index, were
not  significant.  The could be  result of the fact that the number of observations (48
villages) is too small to estimate this regression, but it could also reflect that the extent of
variation that exists across villages is less in Indonesia that is the case in Tanzania.  We
also undertook a further experiment by including in the household-level regression both
the household's index of social capital and the village average.  The household variable
retained its significant and the village variable did not have a  significant coefficient.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  48
These results suggest that households benefit from local associations because of their
direct participation in the association's  activities and that this is independent from the
overall amount of social capital in the village.
This  conclusion,  however,  needs  to  be  treated  with  caution  because  of  the
possibility of omitted-variable bias, in case the regression does not control for all relevant
factors.  We try to tackle this question in two ways. As a first approach, we added to the
basic specification of Table 5 a dummy variable for each village (minus one omitted
village), under the assumption that these variables capture all omitted relevant village
factors.  This raises the R-squared from 0.25 to only 0.32, suggesting that the amount of
possible  omitted-variable  bias  is  fairly  limited.  More  importantly,  it  changes  the
coefficients of the social capital variables only very slightly and leaves their significance
pattern unaffected.  This suggests that our finding of significant social capital effects at
the household level is not the result of omitted variables which could capture the social
capital effects at the village level.
A second and more interesting approach is to include information on the village's
past  community activities.  Our village  data files include  information on the  major
development projects which were undertaken in the sample villages over the past  10
years,  and whether the  community was actively involved in  the design,  funding and
implementation of the project.  On that basis, we constructed an index of past community
involvement for each village (ranging from 0 to 3), and added this variable to the basic
model.  This index was much higher in the richest ten villages (1.62) than in the poorest
ten villages (1.37).  We also included a set of village-level control variables pertaining to
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ethnic and religious homogeneity.  Most i.mportantly,  we also control for the number of
development projects which the village unciertook.
The  results  in  Table 13  indicate  that  past  community  action  is  positively
correlated with  current incomes.  The inclusion of this  variable, again,  changes the
coefficients of the household-level social capital variables only slightly and does not alter
their significance pattern.  We feel comfortable to conclude that, in the case of Indonesia,
social capital effects operate primarily at ihe household level, but that past community
activity  (which  presumably built  social capital) exerts  a  supplementary effect.  We
underline that the regression controls for the number of development projects and hence
the past-community-involvement variable cloes not measure the impact of these projects
on  income.  It  only  measures the  additional benefit  from  the  community's  active
involvement in  the  projects.  26  This  could reflect the  fact  that  projects  with  high
beneficiary participation are more effective (Isham, Narayan and Pritchett, 1995).  This
finding is also in line with the position of Putnam (1993) that it is the history of civic
engagement which  explains differences in the economic performance of communities
(although  it appears that  one  does not  necessarily  have to  go back  in  time  several
centuries, as Putnam did in his study of Italy).
26  The variable  measuring  the community's  past involvement  is negatively  correlated  (r = -0.25)
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Table 13:  Social Capital and Household Welfare: Household versus Village Effects
Intercept  12.2974  (57.42)
Social Capital  Dimensions
Number  of Memberships  0.0116  (1.78)
Heterogeneity  Index  0.0030  (2.94)
Meeting  Attendance  -0.0018  (0.74)
Index of Participation  in Decision  Making  0.0025  (4.35)
Cash Contribution  Score  0.0080  (1.10)
Work Contribution  Score  -0.0009  (0.28)
Community  Orientation  -0.0002  (0.22)
Household  Size  -0.0949  (10.07)
Years  of Education  0.0319  (4.11)
Female  Head of Household  -0.0432  (0.63)
Age of Head of Household  0.0314  (3.82)
Age of Head  of Household  Squared  -0.0003  (3.38)
Farmer  Household  -0.2206  (5.17)
Jawa Tengah  -0.2348  (3.79)
Nusa  Tenggara  Timur  -0.3151  (5.09)
Village  Variables
Past Community  Involvement  in Development  Projects  0.1370  (2.47)
Number  of Projects  0.0038  (1.27)
Upland  villages  0.0203  (0.51)
Distance  to Market  (km)  -0.0045  (1.33)
Diversity  0.0199  (0.49)
lNumber  of Observations  1137
l R-squared  0.25
F-statistic  16.93
Notes: Dependent  variables is In (household  expenditure  per capita).  Reported  are
OLS  coefficients  and t-statistics  based  on robust  standard  errors.
6.5  Conclusion
In this section we attempted to get a step closer to the structural equations which
underlie the reduced-form model  of equation (1), by estimating the  impact of social
capital on variables portraying the ways in which social capital contributes to household
welfare.  We found that households with high social capital are better able to accumulate
physical assets and savings and to obtain credit.  This should help households cope better
with  the  risk  of  income  fluctuations.  The  number  of  memberships,  the  internal
heterogeneity of associations, and active participation in decision making were the key
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homogeneous associations are more likely to  participate.  We suggest that  different
mechanisms are at work.  The benefits to  household welfare are primarily the result of
exchanges in knowledge, which are maximized among association members of different
economic backgrounds.  Collective action requires in the first place a shared perception
of the common good which is easier to achieve amnong  people of the same kin or religion.
We argued that there are two ways in which social capital is truly "social."  First,
there are spillover effects from social interaction undertaken in one sphere (e.g. social,
religion, cultural) into other spheres, leading to improved access to financial and other
resources.  In order to capture these effects the household must engage itself actively in
local associational life.  A dense network of associations will not necessarily lead to
economic benefits to non-members, at least not in the short run.
Second, we identified two mechanisms whereby spillover effects do reach the
community at large.  Collective action occurs more frequently in communities with high
levels of social capital, and past community action for development projects benefits
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7.  Household Welfare and Social Capital:  Distinguishing Types of
Associations
The social capital dimensions which we have discussed so far are embodied in a
wide variety of local institutions in Indonesia.  Different types of associations are likely
to display the six dimensions in differing degrees and they may therefore not contribute
to the effects we have found so far in the same extent.
A key feature of the Indonesian institutional landscape is the active role which the
central  government  played  in  promoting  and  shaping  local  associations  and  their
interactions  with  different  levels  of  government.  It  is  logical  therefore  that  in
categorizing local associations we focus first on whether they are government sponsored
and/or national in  scope.  Such associations include the formal Village Development
Councils (LKMD) and Village Deliberation Councils (LMD) set up to involve people in
local government, the national association of farmers (Kelompok Tani) and the Posyandu
which aim to  promote the health of children and  pregnant or  feeding mothers.  The
average household in our sample is a member of 2.6 government/national associations
and this constitutes almost half of all memberships (Table 14).
The second category consists of religious groups and organizations, which figured
prominently in the inventory of associations.  Three of the ten local associations cited
most frequently by households as the most important groups in their life are religious in
nature:  Pengajian (a  Koran recital group), Rayon  (an organization of the Protestant
church for church maintenance and ministerial support) and Kelompok Doa (a CatholicSocial Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  53
prayer group).  In total, memberships in religious organizations account for 18% of all
memberships.
Table 14: Social Capital Dimnensions,  by Type of Association
Government/  Religious  Production  Social
National  Groups  Groups  Groups
Groups
Number  of Memberships  2.6  1.0  1.1  0.8
Index of Heterogeneity  56.2  54.5  49.1  52.8
Meeting  Attendance  2.7  14.5  4.9  4.2
Index of Participation  in Decision  Making  60.2  68.0  67.7  73.8
Cash Contribution  Score  0.27  0.60  1.40  0.46
Work Contribution  Score  2.76  4.21  2.04  2.93
Community  Orientation  3.6  99.9  92.1  99.2
Notes: For definitions  of categories  of associations,  see text.
This leaves as third category the genuine grassroots associations which focus on
local problems and are almost entirely conmmunity-initiated.  They consist of course of a
very wide array of different groups and cover many objectives.  To keep the analysis
manageable (and keeping in mind the limited sample size of the data set), we split this
category in production associations and social associations.  The former aim primarily to
generate direct economic benefits for their members and the latter do not.  Production
associations  include  various  professional  groups  as  well  as  credit  and  savings
associations.  Social groups pursue health and education benefits, mutual  support for
ceremonies or recreation purposes. 27
27  This classification  scheme  is hierarchical,  whereby  the government/national  designation  takes
precedence  over the functional  attribution. For example,  among financial associations,  the
groups of  the  government-sponsored  anti-poverty program (IDT)  are  classified as
government/national  associations while the Arisan Dusun (neighborhood-based  rotating
savings groups)  are classified  under production  groups. This is done in order to leave the
production  and social groups  as purely  grassroots  as possible. We did experiment  with the
reverse scheme, whereby the functional attribution  took precedence,  but found that this
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Government/national associations have the highest level of internal heterogeneity
and  production  groups  are  the  most  homogeneous, but  the  distinction  is  not  very
pronounced  (Table 14).  Not  surprisingly,  meetings  of  the  government/national
associations are least well  attended and those  of  religious groups the most.  Active
participation in decision making is also the lowest in government/national groups and
highest in social groups.  Membership dues also vary significantly across the categories:
government/national associations have the lowest requirements and religious groups the
highest.  Production groups require the highest cash contributions.  The final  social
capital  dimension,  community  orientation  is,  by  definition,  close  to  zero  for
government/national groups and close to 100 for the other categories.  Annex tables Al
to A7 further break down the social capital dimensions according to type of association
and household characteristics.28
In order to test how the importance of each social capital dimension varies with
type of institution, we split each of the seven social capital variables in the basic model
specification (Table 5)  into  four variables,  by type  of association.  This  presents  a
problem for the heterogeneity index, the index of active participation in decision making
and the two membership dues variables, because this information is only available for the
three associations which the household listed as most important.  Hence, if a household
did not list, e.g., a social association among its most important groups, four of the seven
social capital variables were  missing for that category.  To  address this,  a  series  of
missing value dummy variables were created and added to the specification.
28  For a further discussion  of the types of local associations  in Indonesia  and the patterns of
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The  coefficients  of  the  resulting  28  social capital  variables  are  reported  in
Table 15. They indicate that the number of memberships is a significant variable only in
the  case  of  voluntary  production  and  social  associations.  The largest  effect-one
membership adds 6.2% to household expenditure per capita-comes  from social groups,
which, it will be recalled, are not set up to pursue primarily economic objectives.  This
lends support to the view that the economic benefits of social capital are an externality to
the pursuit of social interaction and the resulting build-up of trust.  One is reminded of
the famous choral societies and bowling leagues discussed by  Putnam (1993,  1995).
Given the efforts which the Indonesian government has put in the creation of a nation-
wide network  of local  associations, it is sobering to note that  memberships in  these
government-sponsored  groups  has  no  rmeasurable effect  on  the  welfare  level  of
households. 29 Of  course, the  government  had  also  other  objectives in  mind  when
establishing these local associations (see e.g. Evers, 1998; Werner, 1998).
29  There is a silver lining to this finding. The recent crisis in Indonesia,  and the change in
government,  will likely lead to a weakening  of the network of government-supported  local
associations.  Our results  suggest  that this may not contribute  to lowering  the welfare  level of
households. Furthermore,  the voluntary  production  and social associations  could well take
over some of the functions  previously  handled  through government-sponsored  associations,
which would be to the benefit  of households. It has been observed  before in Indonesia,  that
in areas where government  associations  are weak, voluntary  associations  step in to fill the
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Table 15: Household Welfare and Social Capital: Distinguishing Types of
Associations
Government/  Religious Groups  Production  Social Groups
National  Groupsl
Groups
Number of Memberships  0.0084  (0.73)  -0.0223  (0.79)  0.0428  (1.94)  0.0623  (2.39)
Heterogeneity Index  0.0005  (0.41)  0.0016  (1.32)  0.0028  (1.78)  0.0014  (1.13)
Meeting Attendance  0.0122  (1.58)  -0.0008  (0.61)  0.0060  (1.41)  0.0017  (0.92)
Index of Participation in  0.0023  (3.30)  0.0007  (0.94)  0.0009  (1.14)  0.0013  (1.38)
Decision Making
Cash Contribution Score  0.0278  (1.87)  0.0136  (1.79)  -0.0008  (0.11)  -0.0193  (2.20)
Work Contribution Score  0.0040  (1.34)  -0.0030  (0.97)  -0.0035  (1.38)  -0.0095  (1.85)
Community Orientation  -0.0006  (0.41)  0.0007  (1.09)  -0.0012  (2.19)  -0.0005  (0.88)
Note:  1.  Dependent variable =  In (household expenditure per capita).
2.  Entries are coefficients and robust t-statistics from OLS regression with social capital variables broken down
by type of association (i.e. 7 x 4 regressors) and the usual set of control variables.
Our  earlier  results  pointed  repeatedly  at  the  importance  of  an  association's
internal heterogeneity.  It turns out that this is most important for production groups.
Such groups rely perhaps more than others on sharing information and knowledge and a
more heterogeneous membership base may lead to  a wider pool  of knowledge to  be
shared.  In contrast, the index of active participation in decision making is found to be
most significant for governmentlnational groups.  Since memberships in most of these
groups is mandatory, it suggests that benefits accrue most to those who take an active
role. This is confinned by the positive coefficient of cash contribution.
The  negative coefficients of  the  cash  and  work  contribution variables  are  a
puzzling result at first sight.  However, the detailed annex tables reveal that the poorest
households  participate  more  actively  in  social  groups,  including  making  larger
contributions in cash and in kind.  This clearly brings out the importance which the poor
attach to these organizations. Presumably, the rich have less need to associate in groups
for education or health's  sake since they can afford to buy these services.  Likewise, the
rich have less need than the poor to get together for mutual support in making affordable
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8.  Social Capital and Household Welfare: Two-Way Causality?
The model underlying this paper and presented in section 4 took the fundamental
position that social capital is an input in the household's production function and can be
modeled similar to human capital and other household asset endowments. However, like
human capital, social capital can be, at least partly, a consumption good.  This is certainly
possible  in  case  of  participation  in  non-mandatory  social  groups  pursuing  leisure
activities.  Since leisure is usually a luxury good, demand for it will rise with income, and
then there could be a reverse causality firom  welfare level to social capital.  If so, the
estimated coefficient of social capital in eq[uation  (1) is upward biased.
The strongest evidence in support of a causation from social capital to  income
was presented in section 6 which estimaled structural equations indicating the positive
role of social capital in access to credit.  Similarly, Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and
Isham  (1998)  have  documented  the  role  of  social  capital  in  obtaining  access  to
agricultural inputs such as fertilizer.
However, the  extent of two-way causality is empirically testable by means of
instrumental variable estimation.  The real challenge is to find a suitable instrument set
for social capital:  instruments must determine social capital but not household welfare
(nor be determined by household welfare).  In order to make this task more feasible, we
return to the aggregate model of section 4, which uses a single social capital index.  We
argue that the following are conceptually suitable instruments for social capital:
(1)  Ethnic and religious diversity of  the village.  This  affects  directly the
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the aggregate social capital index.  If there is only one religious group in
the  village,  it  is  not  possible  to  have  a  religiously  heterogeneous
association.  There is also no reason to  assume that ethnic or religious
composition would directly affect household income, nor, obviously, will
income affect diversity. 30
(2)  The density and effectiveness of institutions in the village.  Clearly, the
possibility for a given household to join an association increases as more
associations exist in the village.  The likelihood to join and to be active in
the  association  can  also  be  expected  to  increase  as  institutions  are
perceived to be effective.  As we have already demonstrated earlier, the
density of associations at the village level does not significantly affect the
level of household expenditure directly.
(3)  The  village's  involvement in  the procurement  of  social  services  and
infrastructure.  Such  involvement  is  likely  to  incite  people  to  join
associations dealing with education, health, roads or other infrastructure.
It does  not however have a direct  effect on household income  (which
stems from the use of such services or infrastructure).
Given the content of the available village data file, this leads to  eight possible
instruments:  an  index  of  ethnic  and  religious  diversity,  the  number  of  existing
associations in the village, the percent of iistitutions deemed effective, and indexes of
30  This position  is not inconsistent  with-the  possibility  that ethnic  diversity  may affect economic
growth at the national  level (as has been demonstrated  for Africa by Easterly and Levine,
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community involvement in the provision of health and education services, water supply,
road maintenance and irrigation. 3'
We added those 8 variables to equation (1) and found that none were significant.
Hence they meet the first criterion for being a valid instrument, namely not affecting
household welfare.  To test the second criterion, we applied the test for over-identifying
restrictions  proposed by Davindson and Mackinnon (1993).  This tests  the joint  null
hypothesis that the underlying model (equation (1)) is correctly specified and that the
applied  instruments are  valid.  (The  latter hypothesis  cannot  be  tested  separately).
Table 16 reports the test-statistic's p-valu, as well as the coefficient and t-statistic of the
social capital index in the 2SLS equation.  To  check for the sensitivity of results to
specific instrument selection, we tested  several combinations of the instruments.  All
combinations lead to  significant increases in R-squared in the first stage equation, and
pass the over-identifying restrictions test.
In  all  cases,  the  instrumental  variables  method  leads  to  higher  coefficients
(ranging from 0.0087 to  0.0122) for the social capital index than in the OLS model
(where it was 0.0069).  This indicates that equation (1) is correctly specified and that
social capital is an exogenous determinant of household welfare.  If there were significant
reverse causality, the coefficient of the social capital index in the 2SLS regression would
have been lower than the OLS coefficient.  The finding of exogeneity of the social capital
index was also reported by Narayan and  Pritchett (1997) for  Tanzania.  The higher
coefficient of the instrumented social capital index implies that a  10% increase in the
31  It is important to point out that these variables were collected independently of the household
data, by means of interviews with village leaders, teachers, health professionals, etc., and also
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household's  social capital endowment leads to  a  1.5% to 2.1% increase in  household
expenditure per capita-which  is in the same range as the effect from a similar increase
in the human capital endowment.
Table 16: Social Capital and Household Welfare: Instrumental Variables Results
Social  Capital  Index  OIR  Test
Instrument  Set  Coefficient  t-statistic  Incremental  p-value
l  _  ~R-squaredl
1.  Diversity,  institutional  effectiveness  0.0109  2.06  0.033  0.39
2.  Diversity,  institutional  effectiveness,  0.0087  2.19  0.059  0.56
institutional density
3.  Diversity,  institutional  effectiveness,  0.0122  2.59  0.043  0.64
community  involvement  in health,
education,  water  supply,  roads,
irrigation
4.  Diversity,  institutional  effectiveness,  0.0098  2.49  0.061  0.63
institutional  density,  community
involvement  in health,  education,
water supply, roads, irrigation
This finding strengthens the case for viewing social capital as an  input in the
household's production function.  This in turn opens up the case for investing in social
capital, just  as investments are made in  human capital.  However, there  is a  critical
difference:  education is  embodied  in  one  individual and  can  be  acquired  by  one
individual regardless of what other people do.  By definition, social capital can only be
acquired by a group of people and requires a form of cooperation among them (although,
as our results have shown, the extent to which different members of a group capture the
benefits  does  depend  upon  their  individual  actions,  especially the  extent  of  active
participation).  This gives social capital an inevitable public good character and this has
implications for its  production (Coleman, 1988, 1990).  In  particular, like all  public
goods, it will tend to be underproduced relative to the social optimum, unless the group
responsible for  its  production can fully  internalize the  externality  involved (Collier,Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  61
1998). Which group is best suited to producing social capital thus depends largely on the
scope of the created externality and this  determines the  size of the  group needed  to
internalize it effectively and avoid free rides.  For example, in the case of rotating savings
association, the scope is local; in the case of the rule of law, it is national and the central
government needs to play the essential role.
To the extent that a population with high levels of social interaction, trust, and
abiding by norms and laws generates country-wide benefits, it may justify a  role for
government.  This  role  would  not  necessarily  consist  of  setting  up  a  series  of
government-sponsored associations (as the Indonesian government did), but primarily in
creating a supportive environment for the emergence of voluntary local associations. Our
results suggest indeed that the returns to mtembers  are larger from voluntary associations.
The government, especially local government, could equally play a role in ensuring that
the poor participate in  local associations.  Our results indicate that the benefits from
membership and active participation are greater for the poor than for the population at
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9.  Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we estimated empirically the impact of social capital on household
welfare  and  poverty  in  the  case  of  Indonesia.  The  focus  was  on  households'
memberships in  local  associations-an  aspect of  social capital  which  is particularly
relevant for households'  day-to-day decisions affecting their welfare and consumption.
The basic data indicated a positive  correlation between social capital and  household
welfare:  households with high social capital have higher expenditure per capita, more
assets, higher savings and better access to credit.
We used a reduced-form model of household welfare, which controls for relevant
household and location characteristics, to estimate the contribution of social capital to
household welfare.  The underlying structural equations treat social capital as an input,
together with human and physical capital, in the household's production function.  The
effects  of  social  capital  operate  through  (at  least)  three  mechanisms:  sharing  of
information  among  association  members,  reduction  of  opportunistic  behavior,  and
improved collective decision making.  The magnitude of the social capital effect was
found to  be  similar to  that of human capital.  Increasing the average endowment of
education for each adult in the household by one year (which is about a 20% increase)
would increase household expenditure per capita by 3.4%.  A similar increase in social
capital endowment would increase household expenditure per capita by 2.3%.
We measured  social  capital along six  dimensions:  density  of  memberships,
internal heterogeneity of associations (by gender, age, education, religion, etc.), meeting
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work), and community orientation.  Among these, the strongest effects were found to
come from:
(i)  the number of memberships:  each additional membership (which is a 20%
increase in memberships, on average) raises household expenditure per capita
by 1.5%;
(ii)  internal  heterogeneity:  an  increase  of  20%  in  the  heterogeneity  index
correlates with a 3.3% higher expenditure level;
(iii)  active  participation  in  decision  making:  an  increase  of  20%  in  the
participation index correlates with a 3.2% higher expenditure level.
In heterogeneous associations the potential pool of knowledge to be shared is larger and
hence the potential benefit to members is higher.  We found indeed that heterogeneity
along dimensions such as education, occupation and economic status (which are likely to
correspond to differing knowledge) confers the greatest benefits.
Social capital reduces the probability of being poor and the returns to household
investment in social capital are higher for the poor than for the population at large.  This
is especially the case for the number of memberships and households' active participation
in decision making.  This underscores the potential pay-off to  poor households  from
investing  more  time  in  creating  social  capital  by  participating  actively  in  local
associations.  We found that at low incorne levels the returns to social capital exceed
those of human capital, while the reverse is true at the upper end of the distribution.Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  64
Social capital is hypothesized to have several long-term benefits, such as better
access to  credit and  a resulting better ability to  smoothen out income fluctuations by
borrowing and/or accumulating assets. Our empirical results confirm the validity of these
propositions and highlight again that the internal heterogeneity of an association and its
members'  active participation in decision making are the key factors.  Membership in
associations whose primary role is financial (e.g. rotating credit and savings associations)
has a strong positive effect.
The effects of social capital are not the same for each type of association.  We
distinguished  government-inspired  nation-wide  associations  with  mostly  mandatory
membership from community-initiated ones with  mostly voluntary membership.  The
latter were broken down into religious, production and social associations. Memberships
in production and social associations have the largest impact on household welfare-
these effects are 4-6 times larger than those from memberships in government-sponsored
associations.  However, when households participate actively in  the decision making
process of government groups, the benefits to the household rise significantly.
Social capital affects household welfare but there can also be reverse causality:
richer households could have a higher demand for memberships in associations and have
more time  to participate (although the opportunity cost  of their time  is  also higher).
Instrumental variable estimation suggested that  the direct  effect of  social  capital  on
welfare  dominates the  reverse effect  in  explaining the  correlation between the  two
variables.  This finding is robust for several sets of instruments available in the data.
On balance, this study for Indonesia found compelling empirical evidence that
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significant contribution to household welfare, over and above that stemming from human
capital and other household assets. The use of household-level data to make this case and
to quantify the impact of social capital is novel in the literature on social capital.  To our
knowledge, this is also the first study which quantifies the effects of different dimensions
of social capital and of different types of associations.
Our findings  support a policy  by donors and  governments to  invest in  social
capital-either  directly or by creating an enviromnent friendly to the emergence of local
associations. Our findings also indicate that investments in local social capital deserve to
be part of poverty alleviation programs since the returns to investment in social capital
are larger for the poor than for others.  Lastly, our findings provide indications of the type
of associations which are likely to impart the largest benefits.
Future  research on  other countries will  have to  confirm the  findings  of  the
Indonesia case study.  Similar work to that reported in this paper is currently ongoing for
Bolivia and Burkina Faso (World Bank, 1998).  Further work on estimating directly the
structural equations which portray the effects of social capital on access to credit or other
inputs, on smoothening income fluctuations and on group decision making would further
add  to  the  case  for  treating  social  capital  as  genuine  "capital"  in  the  household's
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Annex: Detailed Tables on Social Capital Dimensions
Table Al:  Membership in Local Associations, by Region and Household Characteristics
and by Type of Association.
Table A2:  Heterogeneity  Index  of  Local  Associations,  by  Region  and  Household
Characteristics and by Type of Association.
Table A3:  Meeting  Attendance  in  Local  Associations,  by  Region  and  Household
Characteristics and by Type of Association.
Table A4:  Index of Active Participation in Decision Making in Local Associations, by
Region and Household Characteristics and by Type of Association.
Table A5:  Cash Contribution Score, by Region and Household Characteristics and by
Type of Association.
Table A6:  Work Contribution Score, by Region and Household Characteristics and by
Type of Association.
Table A7:  Community Orientation, by Region and  Household Characteristics and by
Type of Association.
Table A8:  Composition of Households' Three Most Important Groups, by Region and
Household Characteristics.
Table A9:  Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  67
Table Al:  Membership in Local Associations, by Region and
Household Characteristics and by Type of Association
Government/  - Religious  Production  Social  Groups
National  Groups  Groups
Groups__
Province
Jambi  1.3  1.0  0.6  0.8
Jawa Tengah  3.2  0.7  1.9  0.2
NTT  3.3  1.3  0.6  1.3
Head of Household
Male  2.7  1.0  1.1  0.8
Female  1.9  1.0  1.0  0.8
Religion
Muslim  2.3  0.8  1.3  0.5
Catholic  3.8  1.7  1.0  1.8
Protestant  2.8  1.0  0.2  0.7
Education
None  2.1  0.8  1.0  0.6
Primary School-Incomplete  2.4  1.0  1.1  0.7
Primary School-Complete  2.7  1.1  1.1  0.8
Secondary School - Incomplete  3.2  0.9  1.1  0.9
Secondary School - Complete  3.6  1.2  1.0  0.8
Vocational  2.4  0.8  0.8  0.7
University/Other  4.6  1.2  1.3  1.2
Quintile
Poorest  2.7  1.1  0.9  0.8
2  2.5  1.1  1.1  0.8
3  2.5  1.0  1.1  0.8
4  2.6  1.0  1.0  0.7
Richest  2.8  0.9  1.2  0.7
All  2.6  1.0  1.1  0.8
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Table A2:  Heterogeneity Index of Local Associations, by Region and
Household Characteristics  and by Type of Association
|  Government/  Religious  Production  Social  Groups
National  Groups  Groups
l  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  Groups
Province
Jambi  43.3  35.0  34.5  46.7
Jawa Tengah  57.0  65.2  54.5  62.5
NTT  62.6  66.0  57.8  56.9
Head of Household
Male  56.2  55.0  48.9  53.4
Female  55.4  48.4  51.0  47.5
Religion
Muslim  52.2  45.9  46.7  49.4
Catholic  60.1  63.5  57.3  53.6
Protestant  63.7  68.6  57.4  61.7
Education
None  54.1  54.8  47.5  57.5
Primary  School  - Incomplete  54.3  54.2  48.8  50.6
Primary  School-Complete  56.3  53.1  48.1  50.5
Secondary  School-  Incomplete  55.6  58.0  44.8  59.9
Secondary  School-Complete  65.7  65.1  58.3  63.4
Vocational  62.7  48.5  70.0  48.6
University/Other  58.6  40.0  53.1  54.2
Quintile
Poorest  55.4  57.8  46.6  49.0
2  53.1  52.5  46.7  51.1
3  55.6  53.1  45.5  53.3
4  57.9  52.5  50.6  55.2
Richest  59.2  57.2  56.0  56.0
All  56.2  54.5  49.1  52.8
Note:  For definition  of categories  and Heterogeneity  Index,  see text.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and jDoverty  in Indonesia  69
Table A3: Meeting Attendance in Local Associations, by Region and
Household Characteristics and by Type of Association
I  Government/  Religious  Production  Social Groups
National  Groups  Groups
Groups
Province
Jambi  1.1  18.6  5.8  1.9
Jawa Tengah  3.3  15.8  5.3  6.6
NTT  3.4  10.9  3.0  5.3
Head of Household
Male  2.7  14.7  4.9  3.9
Female  2.6  11.5  4.8  7.7
Religion
Muslim  2.3  17.1  5.5  3.2
Catholic  3.6  8.1  2.8  5.9
Protestant  3.1  14.3  3.9  4.6
Education
None  2.6  12.8  4.5  3.9
Primary School - Incomplete  2.7  14.2  4.7  3.9
Primary School - Complete  2.9  15.2  5.1  4.8
Secondary School - Incomplete  2.5  18.0  4.0  2.9
Secondary School - Complete  2.6  10.0  4.5  2.5
Vocational  2.2  12.7  8.9  8.5
University/Other  1.4  10.9  1.5  4.4
Quintile
Poorest  3.4  14.1  3.8  4.1
2  2.6  16.4  5.1  5.7
3  2.7  14.2  4.7  4.9
4  2.4  14.0  5.7  3.1
Richest  2.5  13.4  5.0  2.8
All  2.7  14.5  4.9  4.2
Note:  Figures  are  average  number  of  meeting  attendances in  3-month  period.  For  defmition  of
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Table A4:  Index of Active Participation  in Decision Making in Local Associations,
by Region and Household Characteristics  and by Type of Association
Government/  Religious  Production  Social Groups
National  Groups  Groups
Groups
Province
Jambi  59.3  66.4  69.9  66.6
Jawa Tengah  55.7  56.6  58.9  70.8
NTT  64.9  74.8  83.0  80.8
Head of Household
Male  60.3  68.3  68.5  74.4
Female  58.7  63.6  58.6  67.9
Religion
Muslim  57.1  62.8  63.7  68.2
Catholic  65.6  72.5  81.1  77.1
Protestant  63.9  76.8  83.3  86.1
Education
None  49.6  62.8  54.8  75.6
Primary School - Incomplete  55.3  65.9  64.1  72.2
Primary School-Complete  62.2  68.0  70.5  71.8
Secondary School-Incomplete  69.4  65.5  71.6  77.1
Secondary School - Complete  68.8  81.5  77.4  78.6
Vocational  78.2  95.6  90.0  88.9
University/Other  61L5  80.0  100.0  83.3
Quintile
Poorest  49.9  61.9  59.6  73.8
2  60.1  66.5  69.4  71.2
3  61.5  71.6  64.9  74.0
4  64.3  67.7  74.1  71.9
Richest  66.5  73.5  70.1  78.4
All  60.2  68.0  67.7  73.8
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Table A5:  Cash Contribution Score, by Region and
Household Characteristics and by Type of Association
|  Government'  Religious  Production  Social  Groups
National  Groups  Groups  l
l  Groups
Province
Jambi  0.14  0.64  1.04  0.61
Jawa Tengah  0.37  0.12  1.56  0.24
NTT  0.24  0.80  1.57  0.36
Head of Household
Male  0.27  0.61  1.48  0.33
Female  0.26  0.51  0.55  1.78
Religion
Muslim  0.31  0.45  1.40  0.55
Catholic  0.34  1.09  1.81  0.56
Protestant  0.07  0.49  0.04  0.02
Education
None  0.24  0.33  0.69  0.39
Primary School - Incomplete  0.26  0.45  1.01  0.33
Primary School-Complete  0.29  0.61  1.51  0.35
Secondary School - Incomplete  0.18  1.41  1.43  1.24
Secondary School - Complete  0.27  0.92  4.49  1.19
Vocational  0.37  0.23  1.83  0.31
University/Other  0.07  1.58  1.83  0.00
Quintile
Poorest  0.21  0.18  1.00  0.77
2  0.19  0.91  1.14  0.51
3  0.32  0.79  1.73  0.18
4  0.23  0.36  1.02  0.24
Richest  0.38  0.79  2.03  0.65
All  0.27  0.60  1.40  0.46
Note:  For definition of score and categories, see text.Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  72
Table A6: Work Contribution Score, by Region and
Household Characteristics  and by Type of Association
Government/  Religious  T Production  Social Groups
National  Groups  Groups
Groups  l
Province
Jambi  0.06  0.16  0.17  0.10
Jawa Tengah  1.72  0.39  1.39  2.43
NTT  5.21  9.52  5.98  5.60
Head of Household
Male  2.80  4.34  2.03  2.88
Female  2.17  2.82  2.17  3.49
Religion
Muslim  1.11  0.25  0.90  0.49
Catholic  5.30  7.65  5.98  6.90
Protestant  5.19  11.42  6.02  3.52
Education
None  2.57  4.61  0.41  1.86
Primary  School-Incomplete  1.71  3.56  1.55  2.11
Primary  School  - Complete  3.29  4.47  2.13  3.56
Secondary  School-Incomplete  3.74  5.40  3.19  4.14
Secondary  School-  Complete  3.91  4.56  7.33  1.79
Vocational  0.61  2.33  1.24  4.09
University/Other  4.23  2.98  1.90  5.15
Quintile
Poorest  3.07  7.25  2.87  4.77
2  2.46  3.86  2.48  3.96
3  3.06  4.00  1.84  2.93
4  2.13  3.31  1.36  1.51
Richest  3.07  2.39  1.70  1.18
All  2.76  4.21  2.04  2.93
Note:  For  definition  of score and categories,  see text.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  73
Table A7: Community Orientation, by Region and
Household Characteristics  and by Type of Association I  Government'  Religious  Production  Social  Groups
National  Groups  Groups 
NtGroups  G  G
Province
Jambi  2.3  99.6  92.6  100.0
Jawa Tengah  1.6  99.9  94.6  96.0
NTT  6.4  100.0  86.6  99.6
Head of Household
Male  3.6  99.8  92.0  99.2
Female  3.4  100.0  93.2  100.0
Religion
Muslim  2.0  99.7  94.0  98.9
Catholic  5.8  100.0  89.1  99.3
Protestant  7.2  100.0  74.7  100.0
Education
None  4.1  100.0  98.3  100.0
Primary School-Incomplete  3.1  100.0  91.6  98.7
Primary School -Complete  3.8  99.9  94.1  99.0
Secondary School  - Incomplete  4.7  98.5  91.5  100.0
Secondary School  - Complete  2.2  100.0  79.3  100.0
Vocational  2.2  100.0  80.4  100.0
University/Other  7.0  100.0  62.5  100.0
Quintile
Poorest  4.3  100.0  95.8  100.0
2  3.9  99.9  92.8  99.2
3  4.3  100.0  93.0  99.1
4  2.8  99.4  89.3  98.1
Richest  2.7  100.0  89.8  100.0
All  3.6  99.9  92.1  99.2
Note:  Figures are percentage of memberships in associations which are initiated by the community.  For
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Table A8:  Composition of Households' Three Most Important Groups,
by Region and Household Characteristics
Government/  Religious  Production  Social Groups
National  Groups  Groups
Groups
Province
Jambi  0.7  0.9  0.5  0.5
Jawa Tengah  1.3  0.4  0.7  0.1
NTT  1.3  0.8  0.3  0.5
Head of Household
Male  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.3
Female  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4
Religion
Muslim  1.0  0.6  0.6  0.3
Catholic  1.1  0.8  0.4  0.6
Protestant  1.5  0.8  0.1  0.3
Education
None  1.0  0.6  0.4  0.3
Primary School - Incomplete  1.0  0.7  0.5  0.3
Primary School - Complete  1.2  0.7  0.5  0.4
Secondary School-  Incomplete  1.4  0.6  0.3  0.3
Secondary School  -Complete  1.3  0.7  0.4  0.3
Vocational  1.3  0.6  0.4  0.3
University/Other  1.3  0.5  0.6  0.3
Quintile
Poorest  1.1  0.7  0.4  0.3
2  1.1  0.8  0.5  0.3
3  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.4
4  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.3
Richest  1.1  0.6  0.5  0.3
All  I  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.3
Note:  Entries are average number of times each category was listed among the 3 most important groups.
"All" line does not add to 3 because some households reported fewer than 3 most important groups.Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  75
Table A9: Means and Standard Deviations of Regression Variables
Variable  List  Indonesia  Jambi  Jawa Tengah  Nusa Tenggara
Timur
Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard  Mean  ]  Standard
_ Deviation  Deviation  Deviation  |Deviation
Dependent Variables
Ln(Household Expenditure Per Capita)  13.0100  0.632  13.1277  0.528  13.1209  0.619  12.7956  0.673
Fraction of Households below Poverty Line  0.1970  0.398  0.0888  0.285  0.1578  0.365  0.3316  0.471
Durable Goods Score (principal component weights)  0.5600  0.569  0.7983  0.668  0.6645  0.515  0.2454  0.341
Fraction of Households Who Increased Savings  0.1653  0.372  0.0516  0.221  0.3130  0.464  0.1190  0.324
Fraction of Households Who Obtained Credit  0.6121  0.487  0.6075  0.489  0.7735  0.419  0.4557  0.499
Ln(Amount of Credit Received +1)  7.0281  5.789  7.0457  5.854  8.8251  5.117  5.2245  5.816
Number of Times of Participation in Collective Action  25.0704  29.825  13.5931  20.995  30.8728  31.598  29.4380  31.824
Social Capital Variables
Aggregate  Social Capital Index  17.2271  16.975  7.9560  7.731  17.7074  16.125  24.9407  19.578
Number of Active Memberships  5.4617  3.263  3.6476  2.260  6.0025  2.988  6.5266  3.600
Heterogeneity Index  53.2725  19.897  38.8849  15.302  57.6389  18.083  61.6403  18.350
Number of Meeting Attendance Per Membershin  5.950]  6.515  6.7899  °.°95  5.9727  5.490  5.i855  4.6i5
IndexofParticipationinDecisionMaking  63.4931  31.734  63.4909  28.126  55.5768  31.149  71.3713  33.389
Cash Contribution Score  0.6199  1.844  0.6428  1.425  0.65020  1.664  0.5694  2.293
Work Contribution Score  2.8473  5.877  0.12261  0.864  1.4660  5.571  6.6290  6.724
% of Membership in Community-Initiated Associations  52.8911  25.329  62.2211  28.654  48.0128  25.774  49.5014  18.743
Control Variables
Household Size  5.0035  2.192  4.7278  1.940  4.3562  1.680  5.8911  2.540
Years of Education Per Adult Household Member  4.8460  2.442  4.8295  2.557  4.6753  2.549  5.0304  2.211
Female Head of Household  0.0800  0.271  0.0860  0.281  0.0712  0.258  0.0835  0.277
Age of Head of Household  44.7845  13.659  41.4871  14.428  48.3003  13.084  44.2000  12.705
AgeofHeadofHouseholdSquared  2192.05  1319.75  1928.74  1357.89  2503.67  1315.35  2114.66  1227.87
Farmer Household  0.7696  0.422  0.7106  0.454  0.6743  0.469  0.9165  0.277
Land Ownership (Hectares)  1.8549  9.821  2.8979  16.990  0.7266  1.651  2.0561  4.259
Number of Large Animals Owned  3.8593  7.032  1.3266  2.856  2.3079  3.002  7.6405  10.198
Number of Farming Equipment Owned  0.6517  0.552  0.9656  0.225  0.0738  0.271  0.9494  0.501
Jatnbi  0.3069  0.461  1.0000  0  0  0  0  0
Jawa Tengah  0.3456  0.476  0  0  1.0000  0  0  0
Nusa Tenggara Timur  0.3474  0.476  0  1  0  1  0  0  1.0000  0Social Capital, Household  Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia  76
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